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SYSTEMIC BIAS IN PATENT LAW
Alan Devlin*
INTRODUCTION
The ongoing patent debate displays all the hallmarks of interest-
group theory, given the spectrum of diametrically opposed, self-
interested positions that different industries advocate.' Certain
groups maintain that patents are choking cumulative innovation and
commercialization, such that lawmakers should discard or radically
restructure the system.2 Those cries have been met with equally vocif-
erous protestations that the patent regime is the sine qua non of indus-
trial research and development (R&D), such that any change in the
law would have disastrous repercussions. 3
The relevant arguments fall along divergent, but predictable, lines.
Companies that find that the patent regime fetters their business mod-
els, such as firms operating in the information-technology (IT) field,
* Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP. University College Dublin, B.B.L.S. (Int'l), 2004; Uni-
versity of Chicago, LL.M., 2005; University of Chicago, J.S.D., 2006; Stanford Law School, J.D.,
2007. The views that the author expresses in this Article are his own and do not necessarily
reflect the position of Latham & Watkins LLP.
1. Interest-group theory contends that a contained group with concentrated interests can cap-
ture a regulator or legislature that is supposed to serve the interests of society at large. For a
general discussion, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991). On the divergent views of different industries,
see George E. Badenoch & Ishak D. Akyuz, Injunctions and Ongoing Royalties After eBay, in
PATENT LITIGATION 2009, at 598 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 19028, 2009).
2. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 15
(2008). See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002)
(comparing the British abolitionist movement in the mid-Victorian era with the modern U.S.
patent-reform debate).
3. See, e.g., Brief of Biotechnology Indus. Org., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290); Brief of Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Microsoft Corp., 131 S.
Ct. 2238; see also Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 926
n.35 (2011) (observing the importance of patents to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
and collecting sources); Intellectual Property, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/issues/intellectual-
property (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) ("Without intellectual property rights, undue competitors
simply could copy biopharmaceutical innovations immediately, offering their versions without
the high costs and risks to develop the medicines. This would seriously impact the innovator
companies' opportunities to try to recoup their investments."). But see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes,
Not Patents, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
stiglitz8l/English.
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advance positions aimed at diluting patentees' right to exclude.4 Con-
versely, companies for which patents constitute the foundation of
their innovation platforms, such as those in the pharmaceutical field,
seek to fortify intellectual property (IP) rights both by broadening
their scope and making them more difficult to challenge in court.5
Yet, even within the same industry, pioneer inventors' and subsequent
improvers' views on an ideal patent system can diverge markedly.6
The controversy is problematic not because of its acerbic tone, but
because of the lack of information necessary to resolve it and the ab-
sence of an objective framework within which to craft policy prescrip-
tions. Unless one adopts a relativist position aimed at promoting the
interests of a particular industry or industry segment-thus eschewing
the notion that one can articulate economy-wide policies in a determi-
nate manner-it is difficult to discern the optimal contours of the pat-
ent system.
This shortcoming is alarming, not least because those charged with
administering the patent system are presently beset with conflicting
calls for change. Critics have railed against what they perceive to be
the courts' overcompensation of patentees. They single out the entire-
market-value rule for particular disapproval.7 Detractors bemoan the
ever-expansive nature of patentable subject matter;8 the scope of ex-
clusivity associated with patent grants;9 the absence of effective claim-
construction rules that would both cabin monopoly rights and provide
much-needed certainty;10 the indeterminacy of analysis under the doc-
4. See, e.g., Brief of Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2238; Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace:
The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297,
300 (2010); see also Patent Reform, GPHA, http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/patent-reform (last
visited June 17, 2011) (describing the Generic Pharmaceutical Association's commitment "to
ensuring that any patent reform legislation considered by Congress does not contain provisions
that could impede the timely market entry of new generic medicines").
5. See Intellectual Property, supra note 3.
6. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1857, 1858-59 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value
Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seri-
ously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1428-29 (2010); Anish Parikh, Comment, The Proliferation of Tax Strat-
egy Patents: Has Patenting Gone Too Far?, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 202, 204
(2007).
9. See generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
10. See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Com-
mission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. f699, 1704 (2009) (finding no evidence that the patent-
experienced administrative law judges of the International Trade Commission are better at claim
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trine of equivalents;" the lack of an independent-invention defense;12
and the evidentiary rules that hinder defendants' attempts to invali-
date asserted patents.' 3 The patent system creates problems in the
computer-software, information-technology, and business-method
fields, in particular, though patent-related issues also afflict certain in-
novators working in the semiconductor, biotechnology, and nano-
technology fields. 14
Yet, other inventors laud the cited grounds of criticism as indispen-
sable elements of a desirable IP system. The pharmaceutical industry,
in particular, staunchly defends the status quo and, indeed, urges ever-
stronger patent rights.' 5 Given the vast investment required to re-
search and develop commercially viable drugs, the absence of power-
ful exclusive rights would lead to a catastrophic decline in
pharmaceutical innovation and output.16 Certain inventors in other
capital-intensive industries, including semiconductors and biotechnol-
ogy, also require some proprietary control in order to facilitate ongo-
ing levels of innovation.17 Many such innovators seek stronger patent
protection in the form of enhanced periods of exclusivity,18 automatic
entitlement to injunctive relief upon established infringement, 9 a re-
construction than district court judges and considering three possible explanations: "(1) trial
judges . .. cannot master claim construction, especially without a technical background; (2) the
Federal Circuit's claim construction case law is poorly articulated; or (3) claim construction is
inherently indeterminate" (footnote omitted)).
11. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1153 (2010).
12. See generally Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006); Brad Burnham, We Need an Independent Invention Defense to
Minimize the Damage of Aggressive Patent Trolls, UNION SQUARE VENTURES (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.usv.com/2010/01/we-need-an-independent-invention-defense-to-minimize-the-dam
age-of-aggressive-patent-trolls.php.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
14. These industries, which the patent system can negatively affect, typically support any
change in the law that would weaken patent rights. See, e.g., Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-
290).
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 26
(2010).
17.' See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 143-44, 162 (2009) [hereinafter THE PATENT CRISIS].
18. See generally Daniel t. Gorlin, Staving Off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical
Industry's Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823 (2008). See
also Matthew Herper, Are Drug Patents Too Short?, FORBES.COM (Mar. 9, 2005, 1:05 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/09/cx-mh_0309plavix.html ("Expensive clinical trials that come
just as a drug is losing its patent protection are a real problem for drugmakers.").
19. See, e.g., Brief of Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
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duced role for the exhaustion doctrine, 20 and greater contractual free-
dom to bolster the value of their IP rights.21 They also vigorously
defend the presumption of patent validity, as well as the clear and
convincing evidence standard that the Supreme Court has ascribed to
it.22
Like any ideologically driven controversy, the patent debate fea-
tures arguments of varying nuance and scope. Some advocate the
wholesale abolition of the patent system from the U.S. economy23 -a
position that critics typically advance without a strong empirical foun-
dation or a nuanced regard for the likely economic effect of such a
monumental transformation in the law. 2 4 Others counsel incremental
adjustment in doctrine to effect change in a more responsible man-
ner.2 5 Although the micro-adjustment approach is surely more rea-
sonable, those propounding it still face the challenge of identifying the
direction in which the law should move. Given the fact that different
stakeholders invariably take conflicting, entrenched positions on any
patent issue of note, how should policymakers identify optimal adjust-
ments in the law and achieve the requisite level of consensus to facili-
tate their creation?
This is far from an academic problem. For several recent years,
Congress repeatedly tried and failed to pass comprehensive patent re-
forms. 2 6 Some had argued that those failures evidence the judiciary's
superior institutional competence in tailoring patent doctrine more
closely to the traits of individual industries.27 Of course, in September
2011, Congress passed comprehensive patent-reform legislation for
the first time in almost sixty years, bringing such significant changes as
a first-to-file system, post-grant review, qualified prior-user rights, and
20. See, e.g., Daniel Erlikhman, Note, Jazz Photo and the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: Im-
plications to TRIPs and International Harmonization of Patent Protection, 25 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 307, 331 (2003).
21. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition of Respondents Barr Labs., Inc. et al., Ark. Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, No. 08-1194 (U.S. May 22, 2009).
22. See, e.g., Brief of Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n, supra note 4; Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. Cf Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and Afri-
can Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 381 (2004) (concluding
"that it would be irresponsible to recommend abolishing the patent system," but noting that "the
lack of empirical data demonstrating the net benefits of the current system frees us to consider
policy change").
25. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation
in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 965 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 971 (2010).
27. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 95-108.
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the elimination of tax-strategy patents and qui tam false-marking pat-
ent suits by noncompetitors. 28 Although the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA) constitutes a significant step forward in resolving
many difficult problems afflicting the patent system, many vexing fea-
tures of the patent regime remain unresolved. The spectrum of con-
flicting perspectives accompanying these issues is vast, which in turn
implies that consensus is likely to be elusive. 2 9 If the courts must pick
up the mantle from Congress to address issues left unresolved by the
AIA, it would be helpful to provide them with some objective
guidance.
While acknowledging the divergent incentive characteristics of the
various industries subject to the patent regime, this Article identifies a
lens through which one may analyze certain divisive issues that are of
contemporary importance. Those scrutinizing the present system
would benefit by at least partially reorienting their analysis of discrete
issues in patent law away from the industry-specific analysis that is
currently the norm. To the extent that the patent regime continues to
apply rules and principles in horizontal fashion to industries displaying
asymmetric incentive structures, tailoring a doctrine to effect superior
rates of innovation in any particular industry is likely to solve one
problem, only to create more. What is efficient in one setting may not
be in another.
A partial solution to this quandary might be to view the patent sys-
tem as a neutral framework within which legal actors endeavor to pro-
vide inventors with optimal rewards. In its "first-best" light,30
relevant actors would apply the various tenets of patent law with an
error rate of zero. In such a hypothetical environment, the patent sys-
tem would not produce many of the consequences that many currently
perceive to be inefficient. Although no one seriously posits that the
current system works in such an optimal manner, viewing it in such a
light allows one to realize that the relevant rule under consideration is
not necessarily undesirable. Instead, it is courts' and examiners' ca-
pacity to err that renders the relevant rule potentially problematic.
The academic literature has missed this important insight. This Arti-
cle argues that policymakers should scrutinize the patent system for
features that are likely to upset the neutrality of the framework within
28. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
29. See Nancy Olson, Comment, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress's
Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. REV. 745, 752 (2008).
30. "First best," in the terminology of economics, refers to the optimal outcome that would
occur in a hypothetical, ideal world. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory
of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956).
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which judges, juries, and examiners strive correctly to apply the funda-
mental principles of patent law.
To undertake this analysis, one should first inquire into the effect of
erroneous applications of the relevant rule under consideration. In-
terestingly, a rule or standard can be efficient even if courts are inca-
pable of applying the same correctly in all cases. Courts are, of
course, prone to err in making determinations of law and fact.31 An
error in one direction may, however, eliminate the distortive effect of
a separate error in the opposite direction.32 As a result, a court's im-
proper invalidation of a patent, refusal to award injunctive relief, or
other mistaken ruling may not, as a theoretical matter, negatively af-
fect initial incentives to invent. Even if courts routinely err in making
such determinations, ex ante expected rewards from patent protection
will remain at optimal levels if judges, juries, and examiners are as
likely to err in the direction of overcompensation as they are in the
direction of undercompensation and if inventors are risk neutral. In
the long run, variations from the mean should cancel one another out,
such that the expected return from innovation is equal to the level
that would exist under a system in which judges, juries, and examiners
operated accurately. Industry-specific considerations-relating in
particular to those markets in which follow-on innovation is intimately
dependent on the nature of the property right granted the initial in-
ventor-complicate the analysis, but the principle potentially holds
true in the long run.3 3
Rules and doctrines of the preceding type are to be distinguished
from those that are susceptible to biased application. If a particular
rule leads judges, juries, and examiners to err systemically, then the
mean outcome will be one of under- or overcompensation, depending
on the direction of the bias.34 This, of course, is inefficient, though the
extent of the inefficiency depends on the nature of the systemic error.
To the extent that one can identify rules that lend themselves to sys-
temically skewed outcomes, there is a strong a priori basis for revisit-
31. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Con-
tracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1444 (2010).
32. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing that,
"in a reasonably large sample, random deviations from normal rational behavior will cancel
out").
33. One might question the desirability of a system that reacts with indifference to incidences
of under- and overreward as long as the mean reward is optimal on the ground of fairness. After
all, erroneous application of law will deprive some deserving inventors of their due reward, while
granting a windfall to those whose inventions were unworthy of patent protection. Given the
U.S. patent system's unqualified utilitarian foundation, however, such fairness-based objections
carry little weight. The law's sole focus should be on maintaining optimal incentives.
34. Cf POSNER, supra note 32, at 17.
62 [Vol. 61:57
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ing them. Importantly, the normative case for altering such rules
applies across industries.
This Article identifies a number of patent doctrines that may pre-
dispose courts to err systemically in one direction over another.35
These include the entire-market-value rule; the requirement that de-
fendants prove an asserted patent's invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence; the argu-
ment that the law should categorically exclude certain fields of inno-
vation (most recently, medical-diagnostic tests based on
biotechnology) from patent protection;36 and the judicial rule that pat-
entees may enter into reverse-exclusionary payments in the pharma-
ceutical industry.3 7 All of these examples are serious candidates for
revision, though for reasons based in part on decision theory, the last
is the most vexing.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II explores the disparate
array of innovation characteristics that exist in the many industries
subject to the patent system.38 It then explains why the heterogene-
ous quality of incentives in these contexts creates a major quandary
for patent policy and articulates some reasons why these difficulties
render conclusive policy recommendations elusive.39 Part III ad-
dresses a number of specific controversies that currently afflict, and
that have recently afflicted, the patent system.40 This facilitates the
Article's central discussion of systemic error in the patent regime and
the various doctrines that induce it. A brief conclusion follows.
II. THE HETEROGENEITY OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION
A. The Patent System's Professed Purpose
The patent regime's raison d'etre is well known. Inventions and dis-
coveries, the functional embodiments of which are the principal sub-
35. See discussion infra Part III.B.
36. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(finding a gene-sequence patent used in a medical-diagnostic test for discovering the presence of
breast cancer to be unpatentable subject matter), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
37. See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2010);
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Anti-
trust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1074 (11th Cir. 2005). But cf La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 905-07 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a pay-for-delay
agreement constitutes a per se illegal, horizontal-market-sharing restriction on competition).
38. See infra notes 41-185 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 187-276 and accompanying text.
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jects of patent protection, essentially constitute knowledge. 4 1 Both
common sense and economic theory suggest that one can acquire such
previously unknown knowledge only by expending resources, through
educating oneself in the relevant field and then conducting the experi-
mentation required to advance the prior art. In order to induce pro-
spective inventors to undertake this costly process, society must allow
them to appropriate a sufficient amount of the social value of their
discoveries. 4 2 When one commercializes a product or process incor-
porating a novel technology, however, the sold item may be a "public
good," which in the parlance of economics refers to items that are
both "nonexcludable" and "nonrivalrous" in consumption. 4 3 As it is
difficult to maintain private control over information, many techno-
logical advancements are subject to reverse engineering and, hence,
appropriation. 4 4 Competitors therefore have an incentive to free ride
off the innovative advances of their entrepreneurial rivals.4 5 Because
competition induces positive externalities with respect to the inven-
tion and commercialization of technology, an unregulated market will
underproduce socially desirable public goods.4 6
This is the classic economic justification for the IP system.4 7 Unfor-
tunately, this rationale has taken on a life independent of its intellec-
tual mooring and so has become a mantra that many proclaim in
uncritical fashion to defend the status quo in a multitude of industries.
As the following discussion explains, the normative case for twenty-
year exclusive rights over one's claimed invention differs markedly de-
pending on the relevant context. Inventors' vulnerability to third-
party appropriation varies enormously depending on the pertinent in-
dustry.48 The greater the inventors' vulnerability to ex post free rid-
41. See J. Janewa OseiTutu, A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: The Cultural
Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 147, 151-52 (2011).
42. See Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property
Policy, 56 BuFF. L. REV. 409, 478 (2008).
43. See Rita Heimes, Trademarks, Identity, and Justice, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 133, 139 (2011).
44. Cf Stephen M. McJohn, A New Tool for Analyzing Intellectual Property, 5 Nw. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 101, 102 (2006) ("To take a current controversy, Google seeks to create a
searchable database by scanning copyrighted books. Whether the benefits to scholars, students,
and other readers outweigh the costs to authors and publishers cannot be balanced against each
other arithmetically, rather only by value judgments.").
45. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 573,
575 (2006).
46. See J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Innovation Spillovers and the "Dirt Road" Fallacy:
The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery over the
Internet, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 521, 594 (2010).
47. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 440-41 (1999).
48. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1479 (2010).
[Vol. 61:5764
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ing, the greater the case for stronger patent rights, and vice versa. It
bears emphasizing, however, that not all machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter, and processes are vulnerable to easy appro-
priation.4 9 Where innovators can embody their discoveries in a mar-
ketable product or service while keeping the underlying technology
from prying eyes, no public-goods problem emerges.50 Patent protec-
tion may be unnecessary-even costly-if granted in such cases.51
Yet, barriers to successful reverse engineering do not in themselves
suggest the absence of patent protection. Even in such cases, innova-
tors may face a socially undesirable risk of ex post undercompen-
sation. This will occur if the ratio of inventors' R&D expenditures to
their competitors' reverse-engineering costs is sufficiently high.52
Conversely, even when reverse-engineering costs are trivial relative to
innovators' research investment, it does not follow that a public-goods
dilemma will emerge. In certain industries, particularly those subject
to powerful network effects or those in which reputational effects are
strong, first-mover advantage may enable a breakthrough innovator to
capture sufficient returns ex post to justify its ex ante expenditures on
innovation.53
The public-goods dilemma also fails to provide a comprehensive ra-
tionale for patent protection because, at least in its classic expression,
it does not distinguish between pioneer innovations and incremental,
follow-on improvements over existing technologies. In industries
characterized by rapid cumulative innovation-comprised of a large
number of continuous, albeit individually modest, marginal gains over
the prior art-awarding any one inventor broad exclusive rights may
hinder subsequent innovation.54 The phenomenon of "blocking pat-
49. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method Use Exemption
to Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 264 ("Commentators have argued that
patents are unnecessary to provide incentives to invent business methods .... .").
50. For the author's broader discussion of this point, see Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimen-
tal Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 626-28 (2009).
51. Some uncritically argue that it is important to grant patents over such inventions due to
patent law's so-called "incentive-to-disclose" rationale. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood
Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 417 (2010) (observing and
critiquing these arguments). As the author has explained elsewhere, rational inventors of non-
self-disclosing technologies will rarely elect patent protection in lieu of trade-secret protection
due to the ephemeral nature of exclusivity under the circumstances and the cost involved in
meeting the enablement requirements of patentability. See id. at 420. To the extent they do so,
it may be because they wish to raise rivals' costs rather than protect themselves against reverse
engineering. See id.
52. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 42-44.
53. See id. at 43.
54. Granting holders of upstream technologies broad exclusive rights may induce anti-
commons effects that frustrate the commercialization of valuable downstream products. See
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ents" may become problematic in such settings.55 Similarly, a particu-
lar invention may have depended on considerable investment in R&D
and may be resistant to reverse engineering, yet be undermined by the
subsequent development of cheaper functional substitutes.
It follows that innovation policy is a matter of some complexity. 56
As a result, one can neither understand the dilemma currently af-
flicting the patent system nor appreciate the difficulty of molding a
solution without possessing some familiarity with the disparate indus-
trial settings in which patent law applies. Given the broad spectrum of
innovation characteristics displayed by these industries, one might im-
agine that an optimal IP system would employ distinct rules and doc-
trines in different markets. Yet, the U.S. patent regime purports to
apply a single body of rules in uniform fashion.57 As a result, fashion-
ing a desirable body of law that applies in unvarying fashion to hetero-
geneous industries is far from straightforward.58 The following
discussion explores the relevant characteristics of the major industries
in which patent law, for better or worse, currently plays an important
role.
B. The Pharmaceutical Industry
Pharmaceuticals epitomize the public-goods justification for a pat-
ent system. 59 New drug development depends almost entirely on vast
amounts of private investment. 60 Yet, the precarious and costly na-
ture of pharmaceutical innovation may repel crucial venture capital.
Pioneer-drug researchers must first canvass potentially useful chemi-
cal compounds and identify the small subset that ought to proceed to
generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The An-
ticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698, 698 (1998).
55. See id. at 700 ("When owners have conflicting goals and each can deploy its rights to block
the strategies of the others, they may not be able to reach an agreement that leaves enough
private value for downstream developers to bring products to the market.").
56. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821-22
(2005).
57. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRIUCTURE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 300 (2003) ("The patent system makes no effort ... to match the
degree of patent protection to [the various characteristics of different inventions].").
58. Indeed, this fact has led some commentators to suggest that patent law's one-size-fits-all
approach cannot survive. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying
Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 446 (2007); Sean A. Pager, Patents on a Shoestring: Making
Patent Protection Work for Developing Countries, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 755. 767 (2007).
59. See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Governing Health, 121 HARv. L. REV. F. 43, 49-50 (2008).
60. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 504 (2009).
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animal and preclinical laboratory testing.61 Through those tests, they
must demarcate the relatively few compounds that are sufficiently
promising to warrant Phase I trials on human subjects, which establish
whether the compound is safe.62 They must then conduct Phase II
trials in order to determine the compounds' efficacy in treating a par-
ticular condition.63 If a candidate drug survives this scrutinizing pro-
cess-the majority does not 64-large-scale clinical testing on
thousands of patients begins.65 These Phase III trials seek to establish
the effectiveness of the relevant drug and its side-effect profile, as well
as relevant information for the drug-package label.6 6 Phase III trials
constitute the single most expensive and protracted part of the inno-
vative process; indeed, they often take years. 67 The FDA will only
approve about twenty percent of compounds that make it to human
trials (and those compounds are but a tiny subset of those that are
initially studied). 68 Only 1 out of up to 10,000 compounds identified
as "promising" will ultimately result in a commercialized product. 6 9
Of the drugs that do go to market, the majority will not reap a suffi-
cient return to cover the cost of development.70 The industry has to
rely on a small number of "blockbuster drugs" to cross-subsidize loss-
61. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 927 n.41
(2011) ("A pharmaceutical company may screen hundreds of thousands of chemical compounds
as likely candidates for development .... ).
62. David Magnus, Translating Stem Cell Research: Challenges at the Research Frontier, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 267, 267 (2010).
63. Rahi Azizi, Comment, "Supplementing" the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with
Greater Regulatory Authority over Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending the Dietary Supple-
ment Health and Education Act, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 463 (2010).
64. See John Arrowsmith, Trial Watch: Phase II Failures: 2008-2010, NATURE.COM (May
2011), http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v10/n5/full/nrd3439.html.
65. E.g., Tara Arschin, Note. Battling Breast Cancer: New York's Laws Are Not Enough, 13
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 584 (2007).
66. Azizi, supra note 63, at 463; Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic
Test Innovation and Access, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 393 (2011); Elissa Levy, Note,
The HEALTH Act's FDA Defense to Punitive Damages: A Gift to Drug Makers or to the Pub-
lic?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2433-34 (2006).
67. Carolyn A. Castagna, Note, Therapeutic Monoclonal Antibodies: The Dilemma of Deliver-
ing Affordable Biologics to Patients While Continuing to Incentivize Innovation, 82 TEMP. L.
REV. 1071, 1082 (2009).
68. See Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, in Focus ON: INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS 82, 82 (U.S. Dep't of State ed., 2006), available at http:llwww.america.gov/medial
pdf/books/iprbook.pdf#popup. See generally JAMES O'DONNELL, DRUG INJURY: LIABILITY.
ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 60 (2d ed. 2005).
69. RICHARD B. SILVERMAN, THE ORGANIC CHEMISTRY OF DRUG DESIGN AND DRUG
ACTION 8 (2d ed. 2004).
70. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AF-
FECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xv (1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf ("For most drugs, the returns from marketing
do not exceed the average capitalized costs of development. As a result, for a company's aver-
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making drugs and the myriad research projects that do not bear
fruit.7' The entire premarket-approval process for a successful drug
typically takes about nine years.72
Beyond its axiomatic complexity and risk, the foregoing process is
fantastically expensive. Industry observers estimated in 2003 that the
average cost of developing a candidate drug and bringing it to market
was $802 million.73 Some high-end estimates have been to the tune of
almost $2 billion per drug.74 More skeptical, left-leaning observers
have posited a lower, though still considerable, figure of $110 mil-
lion.7 5 Given the attenuated odds of any one identified compound
resulting in a marketable drug, as well as the vast capital investment
required to fund R&D, ongoing innovation in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry is contingent on inventors being able to appropriate a sufficient
degree of their marketed drugs' social value.
Several characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry combine to
create a classic public-goods dilemma. First, as outlined above, the
New Drug Application (NDA) process for receiving regulatory ap-
proval for a new drug is protracted and requires private enterprise to
devote an immense amount of financial resources. 76 This time and
expense leaves pharmaceutical innovators vulnerable to free riding.77
In this respect, the pharmaceutical industry bears witness to the freest
of riders: generic-drug producers.78 These entities' business model is
to wait on the sidelines while brand-name drug manufacturers (1) ex-
plore the universe of promising pharmacological compounds; (2)
devote the capital necessary to determine which compounds are viable
candidates for commercialization; (3) spend immense sums subjecting
the selected drugs to years of clinical trials; and (4) eventually produce
age returns to exceed its average development costs, the company must discover and market a
highly profitable drug from time to time.").
71. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETI-
TION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3, at 5 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Allen Rostron, Prescription for Fairness: A New Approach to Tort Liability of Brand-
Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 60 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1130 & n.16 (2011).
73. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003).
74. See Masia, supra note 68, at 82.
75. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 39 ("Ralph Nader's consumer group argues that
the average cost is only $110 million per drug.").
76. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 5 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
77. See James D. Cox, Brands vs. Generics: Self-Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 15, 18.
78. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming,
87 TEx. L. REV. 685, 713 n.124 (2009) (discussing varying perspectives on the free riding of
generic-drug manufacturers).
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a marketable product. It is only at this final stage that generic-drug
companies become involved in the industry. If they can convince the
FDA that their proffered drug formulation is bioequivalent to the
brand-name drug, generic-drug companies can bypass the regulatory
approval process by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA).7 9 The ANDA process is faster, cheaper, and simpler than
the original NDA procedure by an order of magnitude.80
All this might not matter if inventors could maintain exclusive
knowledge over the molecular formula of the compound underlying
their developed drugs. Yet, pharmacological compounds are suscep-
tible to reverse engineering."' Generic-drug producers have proven
adept at decoding the formulation parameters of pioneer-drug prod-
ucts. 8 2 These companies have developed techniques for ascertaining
drugs' quantitative composition, the solid-state characterization of the
drugs' active pharmaceutical ingredients, and their manufacturing
processes.83 Although commercialized drugs are not immediately self-
disclosing, meaning that interested third parties cannot determine the
nature of the relevant drug by casual inspection, the important points
are (1) that reverse engineering is feasible, even if nominally expen-
sive, and (2) the ratio of profitability from successful reverse engineer-
ing to the cost of achieving it is so great as to be a no-brainer from a
profit-maximizing company's perspective.
In light of these characteristics, some significant reward is an indis-
pensable prerequisite of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.84
This reward need not necessarily take the form of patent rights. In-
deed, many economists have urged the adoption of a government-
funded prize system to replace, or more realistically to complement,
the patent regime. 5 Others tout FDA regulatory rules as a viable,
79. See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceu-
tical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 64 n.24 (2010).
80. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MIcH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REv. 345, 379 n.126 (2007).
81. Arvind K. Bansal & Vishal Koradia, The Role of Reverse Engineering in the Development
of Generic Formulations, PHARMATECH.COM (Aug. 2, 2005), http://pharmtech.findpharma.com/
pharmtech/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=173676.
82. See Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The "Experimental Use" Exception Through a
Developmental Lens, 50 IDEA 831, 842 (2010) (observing that generic manufacturers routinely
reverse engineer pharmaceutical drugs); Pier DeRoo, Note, "Public Non-Commercial Use"
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32
MICH. J. INT'L L. 347, 367 (2011) ("Generic producers are able to rapidly reserve-engineer
drugs .... ).
83. See Bansal & Koradia, supra note 81.
84. See DeRoo, supra note 82, at 367-69.
85. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, A Better Way to Crack It, NEWSCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 20, 20.
2011] 69
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
alternative incentive mechanism. 86 Nevertheless, if one were to pick a
single field of innovation with which to showcase the patent regime's
efficient operation, the research, development, and commercialization
of pharmacological compounds would be it. The field is a paradigm
for Edmund Kitch's prospect theory of patentability, in which society
grants an original inventor strong exclusive rights over the use and
future path of a given discovery.87 That theory posits that an inventor
will efficiently guide his breakthrough technology's commercialization
and future development, whether by undertaking the necessary steps
himself, or by bargaining with third parties to the same effect A la
Coase.88 Given pharmaceutical R&D's susceptibility to free riding,
the fact that patents covering the relevant compounds clearly demar-
cate the boundaries of claimed inventions89 and that, typically, only
one patent covers a given commercialized drug,90 the patent system is
a desirable, indeed essential, component of innovation policy in this
field.
Were the patent regime to be abolished tomorrow, and if it were
not replaced with an alternative reward system, there is no question
that the pharmaceutical industry would bear witness to a catastrophic
collapse in R&D. Given the immense social value associated with
medical innovation, 91 such an outcome would be unthinkable.
Of course, the fact that patent protection is an indispensable com-
ponent of a responsible policy in the pharmaceutical field does not
mean that current levels of protection are in fact optimal. Indeed, the
industry claims that it requires greater protection than contemporary
patent rights currently provide. 92 Regulatory delays, which eat into
pioneer-drug manufacturers' twenty-year exclusive rights, result in
companies typically enjoying less than twelve years of post-patent
86. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 80; William E. Ridgway, Note, Realizing Two-Tiered
Innovation Policy Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221 (2006).
87. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 81.
88. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 472
(2004); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 267-71 (1977).
89. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAU-
CRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 153 (2008).
90. THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 53.
91. See Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, The Economic Value of Medical Research, in
MEASURING THE GAINS FROM MEDICAL RESEARCH: AN EcoNoMIc APPROACH 41, 67 (Kevin
M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel eds., 2003) (linking health-related R&D to a reduction in certain
death rates).
92. Taiwo A. Oriola, Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights as a Bio-
security Strategy, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 287, 313.
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marketing protection.93 The industry further maintains that it re-
quires patent rights of greater duration. 94 Conversely, many observers
criticize what they perceive to be the inordinate cost of drugs in the
United States and bemoan the insufficient level of generic competi-
tion.95 As Part II explains below, this industry is a hotbed for some of
the most controversial issues currently afflicting the patent system.
For present purposes, however, it will suffice to note that the field
epitomizes public-goods theory, thus suggesting the propriety of IP
protection without necessarily dictating the optimal contours of those
exclusive rights.
C. Chemicals
The chemical industry is of vast importance to the modern econ-
omy, producing innumerable substances from such raw materials as
oil, water, natural gas, and metals.96 The industry's output takes
myriad forms, ranging from rubber, plastic, hydrocarbons, synthetics,
and fertilizers to more exotic chemicals.97 These outputs are them-
selves key inputs for countless other industries,98 and thus ongoing
innovation in the field is of self-evident importance. Novel chemicals
have long been patent eligible-typically under § 101's "composition
of matter" prong-and it is clear that such protection serves a crucial
role in spurring R&D in the chemical industry. 99
93. See, e.g., Jeremiah J. Kelly & Michael David, No Longer "If," but "When": The Coming
Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 115, 139 (2009).
94. The Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes applicants that encounter regulatory delays to seek
patent-term extensions, subject to certain limitations. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
95. See, e.g., Shawna Lydon Woodward, Note, Will Price Control Legislation Satisfactorily Ad-
dress the Issue of High Prescription Drug Prices?: Several States Are Waiting in the Balance for
PhRMA v. Concannon, 26 SEA-rLE U. L. REV. 169, 174 (2002) ("The overall evidence is that
U.S. prices are by far the highest in the world." (quoting Dana A. Elfin, Drug Cost Debate
Continues: Industry Opposes Price Controls, 11 BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRs 484 (2000))).
96. For an account of the importance of the industry in older times, see United States v.
Chem. Found., Inc., 5 F.2d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1925).
97. See, e.g., Don Mayer, The Precautionary Principle and International Efforts to Ban DDT, 9
S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 135. 139 (2002).
98. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 511
(1994).
99. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1702 (2009) ("[O]utside of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, managers consistently
rank patents among the least effective appropriation instruments and rarely respond affirma-
tively when asked if patent protection is a 'but for' condition for undertaking a research pro-
ject."); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. Sci. 173, 180
(1986) (noting that the effects of the patent system in the chemical industry are "very sub-
stantial"); F. M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1013 (1987)
("Patent protection appears to be a crucial means of appropriating the benefits from innovation
in only a few industries such as pharmaceuticals and specialty chemicals.").
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Innovation in the chemical field bears many of the same hallmarks
as the pharmaceutical sector.1 00 Given the eclectic output of the
chemical industry, statistics describing average R&D costs are not as
illuminative as they are with respect to pharmaceutical innovation.
Nevertheless, it is clear that research in chemicals is capital intensive,
requiring considerable sunk costs in order to achieve advances over
the prior art. 101 These technological gains are similarly susceptible to
third-party appropriation ex post. Such a setting is, of course, a para-
digm for the public-goods justification for the IP system and thus gives
rise to a strong case for patent protection. Consistent with this,
surveys have revealed that patents are of great importance to inno-
vation in chemicals.102
Of course, vulnerability to post-research reverse engineering is an
insufficient basis to conclude that patents are an unequivocal social
good. Overlapping patent rights, indeterminate contours of exclusiv-
ity, and the number of exclusive rights implicated by a typical product
are important determinants of optimal patent protection. 03 As in the
pharmaceutical setting, however, a single patent in the chemical field
is likely to be coterminous with a commercialized product, 104 and
those skilled in the art can readily discern the meaning of claims di-
rected at chemical structures.105 Given these traits, in conjunction
with the private capital required to fund ongoing research and the
ease with which third parties can appropriate the fruits of invention,
patents are important fundamental components of innovation policy
in the chemical industry. 06
Once more, however, the fact that some form of IP protection is
appropriate in the chemical industry is distinct from the assertion that
the contours of the contemporary patent system are optimal. As with
other fields of invention subject to the patent regime, difficult policy
questions remain. Part III articulates a framework within which one
100. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 81 (using the two interchangeably in a dis-
cussion regarding the importance of patent protection to the pharmaceutical industry).
101. Burton T. Ong, Patenting the Biological Bounty: Re-Examining the Status of Organic In-
ventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2004).
102. Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
389, 389 (2007).
103. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PAT-
ENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011).
104. See Badenoch & Akyuz, supra note 1, at 598.
105. See THE PATENT CRISIs, supra note 17, at 58.
106. One should also note that trade-secret law plays an especially important role in the
chemical industry. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1584 (2003) [hereinafter Policy Levers].
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can more objectively determine the desirability of a proposed element
of the patent system.
D. Biotechnology
Biotechnology has emerged as an increasingly important, yet occa-
sionally controversial, field. The industry has given rise to exciting
new innovations, from genome mapping to genetic engineering. Such
scientific advances have yielded a rich variety of real-life rewards, in-
cluding new vaccines, gene therapy, allergenics, and other medical
treatments. An important biotechnological breakthrough involved a
method for producing hybridomas, which facilitated the production of
monoclonal antibodies that in turn allowed scientists to identify anti-
gens in the human body.10 7 This process constituted the foundation of
effective medical diagnostic tests. More recent technological advances
have focused on gene splicing, which permits the transfer of genetic
material from one organism to another.108 These advances allow
scientists to create organisms with new commercial traits and, more
importantly, to transfer genes for valuable proteins into organisms
that can produce significant volumes of those proteins.109
Advances in biotechnology have ushered in a wide variety of per-
sonalized, as opposed to standardized, medical treatments.110 Tradi-
tionally, physicians engaged in a "trial and error" process, treating
patients suffering from common ailments using a variety of different
drugs and dosages to determine which treatment works best for each
different patient.' Personalized medicine takes a targeted approach,
by which doctors prescribe treatments based on individual patients'
distinct traits.112 These treatments hail from the discovery of bio-
markers," 3 which enable scientists to detect the presence of a particu-
107. THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 144-45.
108. Id. at 148.
109. Id.
110. See William M. Sage, Will Embryonic Stem Cells Change Health Policy?, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHIcs 342, 349 (2010); Personalized Medicine, BIO, http://www.bio.org/healthcare/personalized
(last visited June 26, 2011).
111. See Randy J. Prebula, Note, The Promise of Personalized Medicine: Regulatory Controls
and Tort Influences in the Context of Personalized Risks and Benefits, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & PoL'Y 343, 343-44 (2010).
112. See, e.g., Peter M. Kazon, Regulatory Issues Facing Genetic Testing, J. HEALTH & LIFE
Sci. L., Jan. 2010, at 111, 113-15.
113. See generally Matthew Herder, Patents & the Progress of Personalized Medicine: Bio-
markers Research as Lens, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 187 (2009).
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lar condition, the development of a disease, and the efficacy of a given
medication."14
Like pharmaceutical research, innovation in biotechnology is both
capital intensive and risky.115  It is famously difficult to predict the
ultimate efficacy of a particular biologic being researched." 6 The nec-
essary molecular studies are heavily laboratory based, and, although
significant portions of the innovation process are automated, the req-
uisite equipment is expensive.' 1 7 Biotech companies wishing to mar-
ket new technologies for use on patients must, of course, meet
stringent FDA regulatory requirements, which cause further uncer-
tainty and considerable delays.' 1 8 Due to the investment-intensive na-
ture of innovation in the field, venture capital is paramount.1 19 Unlike
pharmaceutical research, however, government funding plays a major
role in biotech innovation.120  As a result, the interaction between
public and private researchers is of importance.
Given the necessity for private investment, patent rights play a sig-
nificant role in inducing the same. 121 Indeed, empirical research has
revealed that the "patent premium" in the biotech field is high, such
that the availability of IP protection is an important driver of
innovation.122
Yet, private ownership rights rest awkwardly with both academic
and public-sector research, particularly when state grants play such an
important role in financing innovation. Furthermore, inventors' in-
114. Problems abound with respect to the clinical evaluation of biomarkers, the absence of an
evidence base for conducting such evaluations, and insufficient incentives to commercialize diag-
nostic biomarkers. Biomarkers and Targeted Therapies, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/
48/0,3746,en_2649_34537_39405168_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited June 26, 2011). In this last re-
spect, some have observed that companies are unwilling to invest the necessary capital unless the
markers are associated with a particular drug. Id.
115. FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION 1 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/POO83901biologicsreport.pdf.
116. E.g., Steven A. Nash & Rebecca Workman, A New Pathway for Follow-on Biologics, 20
FED. CIR. B.J. 193, 199 (2010).
117. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 1437, 1453 (2010).
118. See generally W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: Fed-
eral Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 283 (2004).
119. See Alison Peck, Leveling the Playing Field in GMO Risk Assessment: Importers, Export-
ers and the Limits of Science, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 241, 265 (2010).
120. See Maureen E. Boyle, Leaving Room for Research: The Historical Treatment of the
Common Law Research Exemption in Congress and the Courts, and Its Relationship to Biotech
Law and Policy, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 269, 291 (2010).
121. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 159 (2010).
122. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in Interna-
tional Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 193, 200 n.28 (2005).
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creased patenting of biotechnology has alarmed many observers. 123
Researchers have patented some twenty percent of the human gen-
ome.12 4 DNA-related patents abound.12 5 Given the perception that
the United States Patent Trademark Office (USPTO) improvidently
grants many patentsl 26-due in part to excessively broad claims that
may overlap to an inefficient degree-as well as the fact that the
agency has issued a vast number of patents in this field, biotechnology
has come to epitomize some academics' concern of an
"anticommons."T 2 7
Such difficulties have led a number of commentators to call for a
research exemption for gene-related patents,128 justifying the plea on
the ground that genomic materials, by their nature, are not susceptible
to invent around. Kenneth Neil Cukier illustrates the point by observ-
ing that, with respect to "genes detecting disease susceptibility or en-
coding therapeutic proteins, substitutes are by nature not possible."12 9
Others contend that the courts or legislature should dilute patent pro-
tection in the biotech field so as to free research and downstream
commercialization from the search, negotiation, and other transaction
costs that currently fetter it.130
The extent of the problem remains a matter of some controversy.
Certain commentators decry the scale and scope of patent protection
afforded biotech inventions, while others submit that generous prop-
erty rights are the sine qua non of innovation in the field.' 3 1 The em-
pirical evidence thus far suggests that those critics' most dire
predictions, such as preclusive anticommons effects, have not come to
pass.132 Ironically, this would seem to be because researchers are sim-
123. See generally Meghan M. Overgaard, Note, Balancing the Interests of Researchers and
Donors in the Commercial Scientific Research Marketplace, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1484-87
(2009) (enumerating the objections that critics have raised with respect to gene patents).
124. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,
SCIENCE, Oct.'14, 2005, at 239, 239.
125. See Policy Levers, supra note 106, at 1625-26.
126. See, e.g., Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and
Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIoH TECH. L.J. 159, 169 (2008).
127. E.g., Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 2257, 2293
(2010).
128. See Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
835, 853 (describing, but not subscribing to, such efforts).
129. Kenneth Neil Cukier, Navigating the Future(s) of Biotech Intellectual Property, 24 NA-
TURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 249, 251 (2006).
130. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 54.
131. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303,
308-10 (2002).
132. See Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Ac-
cess: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 299-300 (2007); John P.
2011] 75
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ply ignoring patents, 33 while many patentees choose not to undertake
the expense of enforcing their rights in court.13 4 This has created an
environment of voluntary nonenforcement in the industry, which
some hail as evidence of the efficiency of private-order solutions. 135
Conversely, others worry that the status quo is unstable and likely to
be undone by enforcement actions taken by outsiders who acquire
patents, as has occurred in the IT field.136
Nevertheless, the biotech field bears witness to some of the most
divisive questions currently afflicting the patent system. Representa-
tively, in 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Pat-
ent Foundation targeted two patented genes associated with breast
and ovarian cancer, arguing that the IP rights stifled medical diagnos-
tic techniques and research, as well as free speech rights, and submit-
ted further that the human genome is not an invention, but instead a
discovery that belongs to all.137 The patentee, Myriad Genetics, sold a
test aimed at identifying mutations in the two patented genes in order
to determine a woman's risk profile for the two forms of cancer.' 38
The price was more than $3,000.139 Some characterize private compa-
nies' obtaining proprietary rights over human genes as immoral. In
2010, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that the gene patents categorically fell beyond the scope of pat-
ent protection. 140 In late July 2011, a divided panel of the Federal
Circuit reversed in part, finding that the isolated genes constituted
patentable subject matter. 141 If the district court's holding had stood,
it would have had significant repercussions for the role of patent pro-
tection in the biotech sphere.142
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PAT-
ENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 335 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill
eds., 2003).
133. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21.
134. See Holman, supra note 132, at 299.
135. See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 985, 1000-01 (2005).
136. See THE PATENT CRISIs, supra note 17, at 152.
137. See ACLU Challenges Patents on Breast Cancer Genes: BRCA, ACLU (July 30, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-womens-rights/aclu-challenges-patents-breast-cancer-genes-0.
138. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (Fed. Cit. 2011).
139. See Rebecca Skloot, Enough with Patenting the Breast Cancer Gene, DOUBLEEx.com
(May 15, 2009, 12:27 PM), http://www.doublex.com/section/health-science/enough-patenting-
breast-cancer-gene.
140. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
141. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334.
142. See generally Lauren M. Dunne, Comment, "Come, Let Us Return to Reason": Associa-
tion of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 473
(2010).
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E. Information Technology
The "patent premium" is significant in certain fields of innovative
activity, including mechanical devices, pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
and biotechnology. 143 With the exception of certain aspects of the
biotech sector, 144 the patent system generally enjoys legitimacy within
these settings.145 Few question the general desirability of patents
within these industries.146
One cannot say the same for computer-software and the broader
field of information technology. 14 7 Innovators in these industries rou-
tinely denounce patents as a major impediment to their work.1 48
Some researchers have estimated that the patent premium in these
areas may be insignificant-even negative.149 If true, this means that
patents are encumbering, rather than spurring, R&D. If this is in fact
the case, patents are operating in diametric opposition to the eco-
nomic rationale that justifies their existence. How can this be? How
can twenty-year proprietary rights over one's claimed invention carry
such asymmetric results with respect to computer software vis-A-vis,
for example, pharmaceuticals? To answer this question, one must ap-
preciate the distinct features of innovation in the IT sector. The dif-
ferences between that field and those in which innovators warmly
receive the patent system are profound.
In the first place, IT innovation is extraordinarily rapid and charac-
terized by continuous incremental improvements over the prior art. 50
Although some advances are technological "leaps,"' 5  most innova-
tion is cumulative, achieving modest gains over earlier versions of
software or adapting known programming techniques to achieve new
functional operations. 152 The sheer pace and scale of innovation in
143. THE PATENT CRISIs, supra note 17, at 47, 65.
144. See, e.g., Symposium, Molecules vs. Information: Should Patents Protect Both?, 8 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 190, 191 (2002) ("In recent years, we have been seeing similar kinds of [opposi-
tion] focused on the practice of patenting DNA sequences, but nothing like that happened when
people first started patenting genes in the early days of the biotechnology industry, some twenty
years ago." (statement of Professor Rebecca Eisenberg)).
145. See, e.g., OLIVER GASSMANN et al., LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 133-34 (2d
ed. 2008).
146. But see BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 2, at 15.
147. See Andrew Nieh, Note, Software Wars: The Patent Menace, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 295,
296 (2010).
148. See THE PATENT CRIsIS, supra note 17, at 4.
149. E.g., id. at 65.
150. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 66 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 280, 283 (2010).
151. R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 476 (2005).
152. See Policy Levers, supra note 106, at 1620.
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the field quickly renders even initially valuable contributions defunct.
For that reason, computer-software patents enforced in court rarely
cover what is then a cutting-edge technology.153 In short, the pro-
tracted R&D process in such areas as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and
biotechnology-which gives rise to significant inventions of enduring
value-is completely unlike that present in the IT industry. Prospect
theory may accurately encapsulate innovation in the former indus-
tries, but it does not in the IT industry.154 As follow-on innovation
pervades the IT sector, providing initial inventors broad exclusive
rights over the use and future improvement of their software (or other
technology) is apt to create undesirable transaction costs that threaten
to stymie cumulative invention. Enhancing the initial inventor's in-
centive to invent through the provision of a strong property right
serves to reduce that incentive for future improvers. This tradeoff al-
ways exists, 55 but with respect to computer software and IT, it is one
biased toward improvers, who play a more important role than origi-
nal inventors.
Second, R&D in the IT field is far less capital intensive than that of
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and chemistry.156 The requisite pri-
vate investment to develop new software, for instance, is relatively
modest.'57 One need not pay for expensive laboratory equipment and
clinical testing. Although nominally significant, such sums are paltry
compared to the sunk costs involved in researching and developing a
new drug. Furthermore, as Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley point
out, although debugging may be tiresome, it does not compare to ne-
gotiating the maze of FDA regulatory requirements.158
Third, inventors in the IT field have multiple avenues through
which to appropriate the value of their technological advances. Com-
puter software, particularly when written in nonhuman-readable ob-
ject code, is relatively difficult to reverse engineer.159 Given its non-
self-disclosing nature, software is hardly a paradigm for the non-
excludable quality typically associated with public goods. Further-
153. THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 57.
154. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lernley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2001); Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the
International Law of Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe's Lead, 16 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 40 (2007).
155. See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 9.
156. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 71, at 2.
157. Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 487, 494 (2007).
158. THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 156-57.
159. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.YL. SCH. L. REV. 63,
74 (2003).
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more, copyright protects software developers against direct
copying. 160 In addition, the first-mover advantage, which is driven by
the network effects present in the IT sector, rewards purveyors of new
software and other information technologies with a direct pecuniary
return.161 Given the ratio of original-inventor R&D investment to
third-party reverse-engineering costs, IT innovators enjoy significant
incentives to invent independent of the patent system.
Fourth, with respect to semiconductors, other forms of computer
hardware, and the IT field generally, each instance of patent-eligible
invention tends to cover a technology that is but a subset of the art
required to commercialize a final product. 162 Unlike drugs, each of
which tends to be covered by a single patent, products in the IT and
computer-hardware industries are invariably subject to "dozens, hun-
dreds, or even thousands of patents."163 Due to a figurative explosion
in the number of IT patents that the USPTO has issued since State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group in 1998,164 the
law charges companies operating in the field with identifying and in-
venting around, or negotiating a license for, countless patents.165 To
make matters worse, the written claims of IT patents are notoriously
indeterminate, such that even those skilled in the art are often unable
to make an informed judgment whether a particular patent encom-
passes a planned product or process.166
As a result, large companies in the IT field have accumulated vast
patent portfolios, which they largely maintain for purely defensive
purposes.167 Various private-ordering solutions have emerged as com-
panies enter into broad cross-licensing agreements and patent
pools. 168 Although these arrangements facilitate the commerciali-
zation of final products, some consider their efficacy to be limited. 169
160. C. Peter Dungan, Less Is More: Encouraging Greater Competition in Computer Software
Procurement by Simplifying the DFARS Licensing Scheme, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 465, 478 (2010).
161. See Scott Baker, Can the Courts Rescue Us from the Patent Crisis?, 88 TEX. L. REV. 593,
600 (2010) (reviewing THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17).
162. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation
Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 430 (2009).
163. FED. TRADE CoMM'N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 71, at 6.
164. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
165. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 27-28.
166. See id.; Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343, 366 (2009).
167. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 55.
168. See generally F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private
Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Navi-
gating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNoVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
169. See, e.g., Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing and the Emergence of a New Patent Market,
9 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 445, 452-53 (2009); Bradley J. Levang, Comment, Evaluating the Use
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In particular, these arrangements do not solve the so-called "patent-
troll" phenomenon, which broadly defined involves nonpracticing en-
tities' acquisition and enforcement of numerous patents that did not
provide the basis for the commercialized products accused of infringe-
ment.170 Furthermore, existing private-ordering solutions grant large-
scale competitors a significant advantage over their fringe rivals,
which lack comparable portfolios and hence possess less bargaining
power.171
Fifth and finally, many observers have criticized the poor quality of
IT patents that the USPTO issues.172 Given the vast number and in-
determinate scope of patents in the field, many companies instruct
their researchers not to search the prior art.'73 Deliberate ignorance
of this kind permits companies to avoid willful-infringement liabil-
ity.174 Yet, this phenomenon is perverse not only because it means
that IT patents rarely contribute technological knowledge that facili-
tates ongoing innovation, but because it leads the USPTO to grant
some patents that are invalid in light of the prior art. Applicants are
under a duty to reveal prior art of which they are aware-the law does
not require them to search for anticipatory references. 175 The result is
that examiners approve many nonnovel or obvious "inventions" in the
IT field. 176
The net consequence is that patents play a controversial role in the
IT industry. Indeed, many observers contend that the law should
abolish patents from the field entirely.'77 Such commentators are not
bereft of support, given anecdotal evidence in the form of vociferous
of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Bio-
technology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 229, 251 (2002).
170. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (discussing
the phenomenon of patent trolls).
171. See THE PATENT CRISIs, supra note 17, at 91 ("If a new entrant without a patent portfolio
wants to enter the semiconductor market, recent evidence suggests that [it] would have to pay
$100-$200 million in patent licensing fees alone. These are the classic characteristics of a patent
thicket." (footnote omitted)).
172. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Can the Patent Office Be Fixed?, 15 MARO. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 295, 295-96 (2011).
173. Lemley, supra note 133, at 21-22.
174. Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV., no. 2, 2006, at 92, 95.
175. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Nor does
an applicant for patent, who has no duty to conduct a prior art search, have an obligation to
disclose any art of which, in the [district] court's words, he reasonably should be aware." (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
176. See Sudarshan, supra note 126, at 169.
177. See, e.g., Julia Alpert Gladstone, Why Patenting Information Technology and Business
Methods Is Not Sound Policy: Lessons from History and Prophecies for the Future, 25 HAMLINE
L. REV. 217, 229 (2002).
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condemnation by management in the industry and empirical studies
showing that such IP rights are rarely a but-for cause of innovation in
IT.178
Nevertheless, abolishing patents over computer software and other
forms of IT is less straightforward than might initially appear. In the
first place, no satisfactory definition of a computer-software patent
has emerged.17 9 Countless inventions that would otherwise qualify as
patent-eligible machines or processes entail the use of software.
Surely, one would not wish to deny such technology patent protection
on account of its use of software (be it tangential or central).
Furthermore, there may be a role for patents within the industry.
Such rights surely induce at least some inventors to develop infor-
mation technology that they otherwise would not. Unlike biotech or
pharmaceutical innovations, which rivals can rarely invent around,
any number of computer-program innovations can achieve the same
result as another company's new software, even if the former pro-
grams perform that identical function in an entirely dissimilar way. 80
For that reason, the fact that a software company's output is not read-
ily susceptible to reverse engineering does not mean that the firm can
necessarily appropriate a sufficient degree of the value of its innova-
tion to warrant its ex ante R&D expenditures. 181 One must recall that
copyright provides a narrow band of protection, preventing third par-
ties from directly copying a particular form of expression.182 It does
not offer a copyright holder exclusivity over the functional character-
istics of her innovation.183
Consistent with this insight, some of the most influential commenta-
tors on the patent system do not advocate the wholesale abolition of
those IP rights from the IT industry. Instead, they counsel a cabined
role for patents in the field.184 Specifically, they contend that IT pat-
178. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 30-31.
179. See John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 304 (2007) (proposing one definition in the context of "several previous
attempts").
180. See THE PATENT CRISIS, supra note 17, at 84-85.
181. See Scott E. Bain, Examining Traditional Legal Paradigms in a Non-Physical Environ-
ment: Need We Invent New Rules of the Road for the Information Superhighway?, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 231, 243-44 & n.59 (1998) (reviewing HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., LAW AND THE INFOR-
MATION SUPERHIGHWAY (1996)).
182. See, e.g., Charles Dougherty, Choosing the Best Method of Protecting Computer Software:
One Size Does Not Fit All, 35 ARK. LAW. 34, 34-35 (2000).
183. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
184. See THE PATENT CRISIs, supra note 17, at 156-62.
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ents should have narrower claims and that the USPTO should subject
them to a more scrutinizing review.8 5
E Summary
As the preceding discussion should make clear, the patent system's
one-size-fits-all rules fit awkwardly with the heterogeneous quality of
innovation that takes place in the industries subject to the patent re-
gime. As the interests of any one industry may be in some tension
with those of others, identifying the optimal contours of patent pro-
tection, as well as efficient doctrines within the law, is a vexing task.
Since one's attempt to reform the patent system is apt simultaneously
to attract enthusiastic praise from one corner and fierce opposition
from another, it is difficult to achieve consensus. Consistent with
these difficulties, Congress failed for several years to pass reform leg-
islation, until it finally succeeded in doing so in September 2011, when
it passed the AIA.186
Given the context-specific nature of innovation, the myriad factors
that weigh upon optimal rates of investment in R&D, and the com-
plexity of devising efficient policies for inducing the same, IP policy
faces a vexing dilemma. The following Part explores a subset of the
major controversies that currently afflict the patent regime. That dis-
cussion, in conjunction with the preceding account of the hetero-
geneity of industrial innovation, explains why policymakers find
themselves in a bind. Indeed, optimal patent rules are so elusive as a
practical matter that one wishing to craft policy can achieve a modi-
cum of certainty only by embracing a quasi-relativist perspective,
which aims to promote the interests of particular industries over
others. When judges, USPTO officials, and academics try to go fur-
ther-advocating broad policy prescriptions for the patent system as a
whole-they likely do so in an indeterminate, and hence error-prone,
manner. The next Part suggests an approach that would enable
policymakers to analyze at least some issues of contemporary impor-
tance in a more objective light.
III. SYSTEMIC BIAS IN PATENT LAW
A. Error-Free Application of the Patent Laws
There is an important distinction between the existence of a truth
and the availability of means by which to demonstrate the same.
Some questions have definite but unidentifiable answers. The nature
185. Id. at 158-60.
186. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
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of an incentive mechanism that would spur the perfect level of inno-
vation is such an example. The contours of an optimal IP regime do
not possess a metaphysical quality, for one can be confident that there
in fact exists a series of policies that best encompass the sometimes-
conflicting issues of incentivizing invention, commercialization, and
improvement on the part of myriad actors in the economy.18 7 In this
abstract sense, one might characterize IP policy as possessing a deter-
minative quality.
Even though one could model such a comprehensive body of rules
within the parameters of economic theory, epistemological limitations
and the cost of the legal system combine to foreclose society's identifi-
cation and use of optimal patent rules. Given the information-
deprived setting within which policymakers actually operate, as well as
the heterogeneous qualities displayed by the various industries subject
to the patent system, one may have to adopt a quasi-relativist perspec-
tive in order to pronounce reasonably determinate prescriptions.
When one must articulate principles of horizontal application to such
diverse fields as biotechnology, semiconductors, computer software,
and chemicals, it is almost inevitable that the proposed rules will nega-
tively impact innovation in some settings and promote it in others.188
Those called upon to address contemporary issues in the patent sys-
tem, including those introduced in the previous Part, face a quagmire.
If one embraces the interests of the pharmaceutical, chemical, and
biotechnology industries, there may be good ground for upholding the
Federal Circuit's clear-and-convincing standard, the entire-market-
value rule, and the legality of pay-for-delay agreements-three con-
troversial tenets of patent law discussed below. If one instead pro-
motes the interests of the computer-software, computer-hardware,
and IT sectors, then precisely the opposite conclusion follows. What
should policymakers do? One answer is that they should analyze a
contested issue to determine its capacity to induce systemic error on
the part of those who would apply it.
To place the analysis in context, envision an error-free patent sys-
tem. In this hypothetical environment, judges, juries, and examiners
would accurately apply every tenet of the patent regime, free from
bias and capacity to blunder. Why conduct this academic exercise?
187. Such efficient rights would, of course, have to be fluid and dynamic, being able to evolve
costlessly and instantaneously in the face of changing industry conditions. Moreover, such a
system would likely entail the use of complementary incentive mechanisms, such as prizes and
regulatory policy, to achieve optimal levels of innovation at the lowest possible social cost.
188. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REv. 51,
101 n.260 (2010).
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To view any given policy question in this light is to free oneself from
the charged presumptions that too often accompany any divisive issue
of note. Such a perspective reveals the extent to which the problems
associated with a controversial policy are inherent in the policy itself
or instead stem from the tendency of those charged with applying the
legal system to go astray. To illustrate this hypothetical inquiry, con-
sider three contemporary policy issues: (1) the relevant evidentiary
burden that one must satisfy in order to invalidate a patent in court;
(2) whether a company can pay one who disputes the validity of its
patent in a legal proceeding to settle the case and concede validity;
and (3) whether it is appropriate to determine patent damages by ref-
erence to the profitability of the infringing product. Each of these
questions has attracted considerable controversy.
First, in a flawlessly implemented patent system, the relevant evi-
dentiary showing necessary in order to invalidate a patent would be
irrelevant because the USPTO would only issue patents that meet the
statutory requirements of the Patent Act. From this perspective,
policymakers would be indifferent to clear-and-convincing and
preponderance-of-the-evidence interpretations of the presumption of
patent validity. If one were to relax the "no-error" assumption on the
part of the USPTO only, however, there would appear to be no basis
for a clear and convincing evidence standard for litigants attempting
to establish asserted patents' invalidity. A preponderance of the evi-
dence standard would yield accurate determinations in every case, as
juries would invalidate patents not meeting the requirements of
H 101-112, while upholding the validity of those patents that do.
Conversely, the current standard would accurately, though inef-
ficiently, affirm the validity of a patent in circumstances when the
weight of the evidence marginally favored a finding of invalidity.
Second, again assuming no error on the part of both the USPTO
and the courts, patentees would properly enjoy an absolute right to
settle with alleged infringers on any terms they wanted, save for terms
going beyond the scope of the relevant patent. 189 In an error-free
189. The meaning of "patent scope" is fundamental to IP law, though the concept is surpris-
ingly ill defined. At the most fundamental level, a patent's scope is coterminous with the proper
construction of the relevant claims. A court's interpretation of the same pursuant to a Markman
hearing establishes the patentee's "zone of exclusivity." See, e.g., John M. Golden, Construing
Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretive Community": A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan
Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 & n.1 (2008).
One who operates within that field of lawful monopoly must do so with the permission of the
patent holder. The probabilistic nature of patent rights, however, complicates the concept of
scope. When one artificially bolsters the expected validity of one's patent by creating an impedi-
ment to challenging it in court, does that action carry with it anticompetitive effects going be-
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world, patentees could pay generic-drug producers whatever they
wished to refrain from entering the market. Of course, with an un-
questionably valid patent-and assuming no dispute as to claim con-
struction and ensuing reach of the patentl 90-pioneer-drug
manufacturers would be unlikely to pay anything.
If one were to again introduce error into the USPTO's, but not the
courts', operations, litigants' current right to enter into reverse-
exclusionary agreements in the pharmaceutical industry-save where
there is clear evidence of the asserted patents' invalidity or nonin-
fringement-may appear to be undesirable. Where the evidence
available to the court shows that the patent is more than likely invalid
or not infringed, allowing a pay-for-delay agreement permits the pat-
entee to appropriate greater value from its IP than Congress granted
it through the Patent Act. If one accepts the parameters of patentabil-
ity set forth in §§ 101-112 to be coterminous with the socially desira-
ble level of property protection in the pharmaceutical industry,'91
pioneer-drug manufacturers' reverse-exclusionary agreements allow
them to artificially enhance the expected validity of their patent rights.
This would necessarily result in patentee overcompensation. 9 2
Where agencies but not the courts err, the law would efficiently allow
pharmaceutical companies to enter into these arrangements only
when the evidence makes it more likely than not that the underlying
patent is valid and infringed.
With respect to the entire-market-value rule, which requires fact
finders to base their damage calculations for infringement on the prof-
itability of the infringing product, a flawless patent system would yield
accurate damage determinations. When the accused product involves
myriad technologies, of which the asserted claims capture only a mod-
est subset, juries would correctly discount the market value of the ac-
cused device by the patent's percentage technological contribution.
Juries would similarly calculate a reasonable royalty by reference to
hypothetical negotiations that would have taken place ex ante, as op-
posed to ex post.
yond that inherent in the patent grant authorized by Congress? The questions become all the
more difficult.
190. Compound and formulation pharmaceutical patents have well-established meanings to
those skilled in the art, so disputes over claim construction in that industry are relatively rare.
191. Such a normative baseline is open to question, for reasons addressed below, though em-
ploying a different metric raises problems of legitimacy.
192. This result, however, follows only if one accepts that the optimal degree of patent protec-
tion is what follows from accurate application of the conditions of patentability enshrined in the
Patent Act.
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One might deride the preceding observations on account of their
lack of realism. Yet, viewing a policy question in this first-best light,
unfettered by the practical problems and imperfections that invariably
accompany real-life issues, serves a valuable illuminative purpose. It
reveals that a particular tenet of patent law may exist to remedy or
contain courts' capacity to err. Similarly, it may demonstrate that a
rule's controversial nature follows only from judges', juries', and ex-
aminers' tendency to misapply it. This, too, is valuable information.
If appeal to an error-free legal environment suggests that the relevant
rule would have no inefficient repercussions, it enables interested ob-
servers to focus on the nature of the policy challenge, which is not
necessarily the substantive rule being scrutinized, but the.phenome-
non of those responsible for failing to properly apply it.
Of course, contemporary criticism does not arise from challenged
policies' negative impact in a hypothetical world in which the legal
system operates perfectly. Instead, critics rail against the clear and
convincing evidence standard because they believe that it accentuates
the tendency of courts to mistakenly uphold the validity of a patent
that falls short of statutory conditions of patentability.193 It is the ten-
dency of judges, juries, and examiners to misapprehend the nature of
the claimed invention in light of the prior art that makes the eviden-
tiary threshold for invalidating a patent pertinent at all. Given rele-
vant actors' inherent capacity to err-a tendency that is magnified in
the patent realm vis-A-vis other settings on account of the former's
unique complexity-the clear and convincing evidence requirement
arguably serves to accentuate that capacity.
Commentators likewise criticize pay-for-delay agreements, in part
because the courts' permitting many such arrangements aggravates
the problem of the USPTO's erroneously issuing "bad patents." 94
Not only may such arrangements allow patentees to derive value from
patents that they should never have received, the courts' limited ca-
pacity to make the pretrial determinations of validity and infringe-
ment that are necessary for upholding the validity of reverse-
exclusionary payments also ensures that they are likely to commit a
high proportion of Type II errors.195 Similarly, the current-market-
value rule exacerbates jurors' tendency to calculate damages incor-
193. See, e.g., Brief of Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290).
194. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Reg-
ulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006).
195. A Type I error refers to a false positive, while a Type II error refers to a false negative.
See, e.g., Jason R. Bent. The Telltale Sign of Discrimination: Probabilities, Information Asymme-
tries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 797, 823 (2011).
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rectly, which magnifies the Type I error cost of a court's mistaken de-
termination of infringement.
The same analysis holds true for a host of divisive issues of patent
law decided by the Supreme Court in recent years. Patentees' auto-
matic right to injunctive relief in the event of established infringement
would not be problematic if the courts and the USPTO never erred,
for courts would grant equitable relief only in actual cases of valid
patents' infringement.19 6 The Court's ruling in MedImmune, which
granted licensees standing to bring declaratory judgment actions of
invalidity, 197 would be unnecessary if the USPTO never issued bad
patents. The alleged problem pre-Medlmmune was that licensees
were reluctant to cease royalty payments and thus risk liability for
patent infringement, which was a prerequisite of standing to challenge
the licensed patent's validity or infringement. 1 9 8
Similarly, the Court's rejection of the "teaching-suggestion-
motivation" test as a rigid test of obviousness would have been mean-
ingless absent judicial and institutional capacity to err. In an error-
free world, examiners and judges would reject and find invalid, re-
spectively, any purported invention that would have been obvious to
one skilled in the art. These determinations would, in such an envi-
ronment, be invariant to the technical test giving rise to them. Given
the hypothetical, backward-looking nature of the obviousness inquiry,
however, the real-life probability of courts and examiners reaching an
erroneous conclusion is significant. The Court saw fit to alter the
means by which those entities engage in the relevant analysis because
it determined that the judiciary was committing a disproportionate
number of Type II errors.
Interestingly, those who wish to restrict patent-eligible subject mat-
ter necessarily presuppose critical levels of examiner and judicial er-
ror. Many advocate the scaling back or wholesale elimination of
patent protection for entire fields of innovation, especially business
methods, but also computer software and IT.199 Some urge
lawmakers to deny protection to gene sequences and medical-
diagnostic tests founded on biotechnology. 200 Such a large-scale re-
traction of patent protection would be imprecise, inevitably entailing
196. This assertion must be qualified on the basis that it assumes optimal scope and duration,
as well as obviousness and disclosure requirements.
197. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
198. See, e.g., John M. Vassiliades, Must MedImmune Breach Its Patent Before It Sues?, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005452408.
199. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
207, 221 (2011).
200. See, e.g., id.
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Type I and II errors in application. One could defend such a policy by
pointing to judges', juries', and examiners' more frequent and severe
misapplication of the novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and disclosure
conditions of patentability. Correct application of these conditions
would effectively foreclose negative effects of the kind that critics
could proffer in support of restricted subject matter. One might read
Bilski as vindicating the view that the system is not as heavily error
prone as some commentators suggest. 201
It follows that most criticized features of the contemporary patent
system are controversial due to the many imperfections inherent in
the judiciary's and the USPTO's operations. This fact raises the
question whether judges', juries', and examiners' inaccurate applica-
tion of patent rules may in itself give rise to a mode of critical analysis
within which one could explore the optimal contours of any given
doctrine.
B. Analyzing Patent Policy Through the Lens of Systemic Bias
Courts, examiners, and academics operate in the real world and are
thus subject to the full panoply of limitations and constraints that bind
us all. As the preceding discussion explained, hostility to a particular
rule invariably emanates from that rule's misapplication, rather than
from the consequences of its accurate enforcement. This might seem
to be an academic observation, but it necessarily raises an important
question. If courts regularly misapply tenets of patent law, what is the
social harm?
1. Departures from the Mean May Cancel Each Other out over
Time
The answer to the posed query might appear self-evident, but it is
not. Many of us are accustomed to framing questions of justice in
case-specific terms, such that we are not indifferent to two erroneous
decisions if their respective consequential effects cancel one another
out.2 0 2 Within the utilitarian framework of patent jurisprudence, how-
ever, policy would properly subsume case-specific determinations of
optimal property protection within the larger question whether the ex
ante expected value of innovation aligns with the social optimum.
Counterintuitively, it is possible that courts could misapply a rule in
201. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226-27 (2010) (holding that the machine-or-
transformation test is not the exclusive test of patentability for process claims).
202. For instance, many people would object to a situation in which a court mistakenly acquit-
ted a person of a criminal offense and then later erroneously finds him guilty of a distinct,
though similarly serious, offense.
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every case, and yet impart efficient incentives to invent. To be clear, it
is unlikely that any one misapplication of law, or determination of
fact, would give rise to an optimal expected reward ex ante. Never-
theless, across many parties, over time, and with a sufficient number
of cases, the average of all outcomes may approach the optimal
reward.
One could illustrate this possibility in many ways. Take the ex-
ample of damages. Assume that a court has correctly found an as-
serted patent valid and infringed, such that the sole remaining issue
concerns the patentee's proper compensation. Suppose that the par-
ticular defendant had been a prospective licensee of the patented
technology but, after negotiations, had elected to eschew a license.
The defendant (a prospective licensee) mistakenly believed that it
could invent around the patent by designing its product to avoid the
scope of the claims. Due to the parties' noncredible assertions as to
their respective reservation prices, the jurors would lack conclusive
means to identify the price to which the parties would have agreed
absent the infringement. If that royalty term were $2 million per year
and the jury returns a damage award of only $1.5 million, the judicial
system would have undercompensated the patentee.
What if the preceding defendant were just one of several infringing
companies? Offensive nonmutual issue preclusion would not apply to
the first jury's damage award unless the facts relevant to the calcu-
lation were identical to subsequent cases. 203 If it were to apply, how-
ever, it would perpetuate the mistake over all cases initiated by the
same plaintiff over the same patent.204 Assuming the nonapplication
of collateral estoppel, though, subsequent cases would likely yield a
range of damage determinations around the $2 million mark. This
would hold true if the plaintiff brings suit against each of these infring-
ing entities, the parties do not settle, each jury is privy to the same
information that the first one enjoyed in returning a $1.5 million ver-
dict, and no judge in any case makes mistaken evidentiary rulings that
bias the expected outcome.
There are far too many variables to expect a given patentee's com-
pensation to be optimal over a limited number of lawsuits. Neverthe-
less, if one were to expand consideration to include all patentees
203. See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
204. See, e.g., Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 2d 623,
633-34 (D. Del. 2008) (holding that the law precluded the patentee from relitigating the issue of
lost profits under the defensive-nonmutual-issue-preclusion doctrine).
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within the relevant field of innovation, other things being equal, one
would expect the mean reward to approximate the correct one.
Case-specific departures from optimal compensation can and do oc-
cur in countless ways. Juries may seriously err in unfathomable cases
involving financial harm of indeterminate magnitude. Such instances
might involve the profit that would have flowed from sales that never
took place or a license that would have opened up larger business
opportunities. A court may grant injunctive relief in circumstances
when a correct application of the four-factor test in equity would have
directed the opposite result. Patentee overreward may occur when
the courts (or the USPTO) fail to invalidate (or reject) an obvious,
nonnovel, nonuseful, or nonenabled claimed invention, or when
courts give claims a broader construction than comports with the pat-
entees' actual invention.
Yet, each instance of overcompensation may in itself be irrelevant,
depending on the relative incidence and magnitude of cases of
undercompensation. The tendency of the courts and the USPTO to
err stems from the amorphous, and hence probabilistic, nature of the
many questions they are called upon to address. Contested factual
issues, complex legal questions (such as claim construction), and
myriad other imponderables that weigh upon determinations of scope,
validity, infringement, and damages require decisionmakers to rule in
circumstances of incomplete information. Each individual case is
unlikely to yield patentee reward precisely commensurate with the
social optimum. Instead, outcomes in patent-infringement suits are
likely to occupy a spectrum-most will depart from the objectively
correct result, some toward overcompensation, others toward
undercompensation. Over the long run, though, deviations from the
mean should cancel one another out.2 0 5 If judges, juries, and examin-
ers strive to reach the correct outcome, given the information at hand,
then their case-specific departures from the right result are as likely to
be in one direction as they are in the other.
The fact of ex post error-even if it is pervasive-may therefore be
irrelevant to ex ante incentives. Inventors spurred by the patent sys-
tem to innovate do so on a forward-looking basis. It is the expected
value of R&D that drives such risk-neutral entities to engage in the
costly process of invention.206 By the time a court erroneously invali-
dates a pharmaceutical patent, for instance, which protected hundreds
205. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
206. Large-scale inventors are likely to be risk neutral as they are apt to hold a diversified
portfolio of ongoing research projects, the risk profiles of which do not correlate with one an-
other. Start-up companies, however, are more likely to be risk averse, such that pervasive mci-
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of millions of dollars' worth of R&D costs, the relevant company's
innovation is already a completed act. To the extent such a mistaken
ruling has pernicious consequences, they are largely limited to inno-
vation processes that companies have yet to undertake. 207 Such sup-
pressive effects on dynamic efficiency are serious, of course. Yet,
erroneous rulings of this sort need not distort incentives. To continue
the example in the context of pharmaceuticals, if a court upholds the
validity of a patent in circumstances where it should not, that osten-
sible windfall in fact combines with instances of erroneous deprivation
to render the expected value of innovation equal to the social opti-
mum. Of course, this does not mean that the law achieves horizontal
equity or that each individual patentee actually receives the socially
desirable level of compensation. Nevertheless, such a patent system
would impart desirable incentives ex ante on risk-neutral inventors.
In.this respect-if the mean compensation bestowed by the patent sys-
tem is equal to the optimal level-the quality of the patent system
may be invariant to the standard deviation of the return granted pat-
entees within a population of patent-infringement decisions.
Of course, the larger question of that system's efficiency would be
rather more complicated. Although companies that have a diversified
portfolio of investments are likely to be risk neutral, some innova-
tors-particularly individuals or start-up companies, which depend on
the success of a limited number of projects for their survival-may be
risk averse. A patent system that facilitates patentee reward of high
variance around the (optimal) mean would undercompensate such
inventors.
Furthermore, it may not be the case that even optimal ex ante in-
centives translate into an efficient patent regime. Incentives to com-
mercialize are also important, particularly with respect to capital-
intensive or risk-filled industries that require considerable post-
patent-grant investment to market the technology-bearing product.208
Erroneous deprivation in such settings may impose uncontained costs
that a separate mistaken recognition of a patent would not eliminate.
Similarly, incorrect recognition of patent rights in settings of rapid cu-
mulative innovation stymies the efforts of third-party improvers, thus
disrupting scientific progress in a serious way. Erroneous application
dences of under- and overreward will provide insufficient incentives to invent if the mean
expected reward is equal to the optimal level.
207. An important exception is erroneous validations occuring pre-commercialization in cir-
cumstances where marketing entails considerable investment and is vulnerable to free riding by
third-party competitors.
208. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2001).
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of the patent laws may therefore carry inefficiency-inducing externali-
ties, even if the expected reward under those laws equals the optimal
level.
Despite these complications, it remains true that case-specific de-
partures from optimal patentee compensation need not skew ex ante
incentives to invent, which remain the primary concern of the patent
system. 209 This Article is concerned, however, with circumstances in
which the mean compensation for patentees departs significantly from
the optimal level. To the extent particular features of the patent sys-
tem give rise to such systemic bias, they are undesirable. The follow-
ing discussion explores the possibility that certain tenets of patent law
invite consistent under- or overreward on the part of patentees.
2. Systemic Bias in Patent Law
There are a variety of reasons to believe that courts and the USPTO
display a bias in certain cases. That is, despite their sincere efforts,
they may render determinations that consistently result in under- or
overcompensation, depending on the context. To the extent it exists,
such systemic bias leads to long-run departures from the efficient level
of compensation and hence skews incentives to invent and commer-
cialize. Yet, more must be said about the phenomenon of systemic
bias and the manner in which it materializes. The concept is in some
respects a perplexing one, as one would normally expect that compe-
tent actors who endeavor to reach the correct result would succeed in
doing so on average-that is, in many cases over time. Bias in this
context arises from frame of reference. It is well known in the behav-
ioral literature, for example, that one can significantly influence sur-
vey outcomes by phrasing the same substantive question in different
terms.210 Framing may have a particularly powerful impact in condi-
tions of uncertainty, 211 such as those of incomplete information, fac-
tual complexity, or other environments where determinative
conclusions are elusive.212 Patent cases, of course, invariably display
such traits. It is well established that people, acting in situations of
209. For the author's larger discussion of this point, see Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood
Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 416 (2010).
210. See HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATIITUDE
SURVEYS: EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT (1996).
211. See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics
Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 2098, 2112 (2008) (noting the well-established bias
of reference dependence; namely, "the tendency to judge things not in absolute value, but rather
in relative terms as compared to some focal level (the reference point)").
212. See, e.g., ROSE McDERMOTr, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PROSPECT
THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 20-21 (1998).
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great complexity or uncertainty, resort to heuristics to inform their
decision making.213 Those heuristics, in turn, are themselves vulnera-
ble to systemic bias. 2 1 4
Given the imprecise nature of proof, the metaphysical quality of
claim-term meaning with respect to certain arts (particularly IT), the
speculative process of determining damages using counterfactual
frames of reference, and the byzantine nature of some technologies
that confounds layperson understanding, the questions that the patent
system puts to judges and juries are fraught with uncertainty. In such
an environment, the law should endeavor to present legal and factual
issues to the relevant decision maker in a neutral manner designed to
facilitate unbiased determinations. This is a principle of uniform ap-
plication, the normative legitimacy of which transcends any one indus-
try. It may indeed be the case that industry-specific analysis can guide
courts toward a superior patent system, but screening for systemic bias
is an independently desirable goal.
To present a sustained analysis of bias in the patent system, this
Article considers certain areas of contemporary discord within the
patent field. This discussion begins by examining the Federal Circuit's
clear and convincing evidence standard, proceeds by exploring the na-
ture of the entire-market-value rule and the courts' reception of pay-
for-delay agreements, and then scrutinizes a number of policy issues
that have recently been the subject of Supreme Court rulings. The
Article concludes by questioning certain aspects of the patent system's
one-size-fits-all constitution in light of the disparate industry settings
to which it applies.
a. Clear and Convincing Evidence as an Impediment to
Patent Invalidation
The Patent Act bestows every issued patent with a presumption of
validity. Congress left it to the courts to specify the legal effect of this
presumption. The Federal Circuit has long required, and the Supreme
Court recently confirmed, that the party wishing to invalidate a patent
to prove its invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 2 1 5 Such a
213. E.g., Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influ-
ence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 939-40 (1990).
214. Sara Slinn, No Right (to Organize) Without a Remedy: Evidence and Consequences of the
Failure to Provide Compensatory Remedies for Unfair Labour Practices in British Columbia, 53
McGILL L.J. 687, 696 n.18 (2008).
215. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
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showing obviously surpasses the typical evidentiary burden one faces
in civil proceedings, which is a preponderance of the evidence.216
Whence cometh the presumption? Its rationale is hardly esoteric.
The USPTO is an expert agency, comprised of examiners who work
on applications involving technologies with which they are familiar.217
The USPTO grants an allowance only after the pertinent examiner,
who is skilled in the art, scrutinizes the claimed invention, engages in
the relevant to-and-fro with the applicant, and rejects any claims that
he or she perceives to be inconsistent with the requirements of the
Patent Act. 2 18 As the sphere of patentable subject matter encom-
passes an eclectic range of byzantine-indeed, occasionally exotic-
technologies, an expert agency's determination of patentability is
surely entitled to deference. 219
Courts, by contrast, are comprised of lay judges, juries, and law
clerks, none of whom (save by chance) is fluent in the relevant techno-
logical underpinnings of the patents with which they are presented.
Indeed, patented claims are sufficiently complex that a number of ob-
servers have questioned the courts' institutional competence to make
informed determinations of claim construction, validity, and infringe-
ment. 220 Given the asymmetric scientific expertise possessed by the
USPTO and the courts, it is only natural that the latter would defer in
some way to the former's conclusions.
Nevertheless, the clear and convincing evidence standard has been
a lightning rod for criticism. 221 Experience has revealed that the
USPTO's substantive expertise is, in certain important respects, illu-
sory. Although the agency assigns examiners to applications based on
216. See, e.g., Gregory S. Fisher, An Evaluation of Alaska's Standard for Wage and Hour
Exemptions, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 97, 98 (2011).
217. See, e.g., David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms Prosecuting
Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 339 (2000).
218. See, e.g., USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.06(f) (8th rev. ed.
2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/doc/mpep/documents/front/htm.
219. But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive
to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 747-48 (1986).
220. 153 CONG. REC. H1430-31 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. Howard L.
Berman) ("Patent law is an extremely complex body of law involving analysis of intricate tech-
nologies, and Federal district court judges spend an inordinate amount of time on patent cases,
even though patent cases only make up 1 percent of the docket. The combination of the com-
plex science and technology, the unique patent procedures and laws, the administration of the
courts and their dockets, and the sheer number of issues raised by patent litigation makes im-
provement of the patent adjudication system a uniquely complicated, difficult, but necessary,
task."). From this perspective, one should applaud a recently enacted pilot patent project, which
would allow courts to assign patent cases to judges who have a stated preference for them. H.R.
628, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
221. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 47 (2007).
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their familiarity with the relevant art, a variety of factors undermine
the reliability of the USPTO's conclusions. The reason is simple: the
sheer volume of applications that the USPTO receives overwhelms
the agency. Although it increased the number of allowances from
189,120 in 2009 to 240,438 in 2010, in the latter year there were
726,331 utility, plant, reissue, and design applications pending before
the USPTO. 2 2 2 Due to the backlog, the average current pendency is
almost three years.2 2 3 Despite the amount of time applications remain
before the USPTO, examiners spend only, on average, eighteen hours
on each one.2 2 4 The applicant, who is presumably more closely ac-
quainted with the field, is under no duty to conduct a search of the
prior art.2 2 5 She must merely reveal that of which she is aware.2 2 6
Third parties, who may also be knowledgeable, traditionally played no
role in the prosecution process, though this will change to some de-
gree on account of the ALA. 2 2 7
Further problems exist. Examiners are compensated under a count
system, which only credits the first action (the examiner's initial deter-
mination of patentability) and the disposal (when the USPTO issues a
patent or the applicant abandons the application or files a request for
continued examination [RCE]). 2 28 This system gives examiners a pe-
cuniary incentive to spend less than the optimal number of hours on
complex applications. Furthermore, anecdotal reports recount a cul-
ture of permissibility at the USPTO, such that the agency tends to
resolve borderline questions in the applicant's favor.229 Finally, and
oddly, the continuation procedure means that an examiner can never
dispose, once and for all, of an undeserving application. She may is-
sue what is misleadingly known as a "final rejection," but an applicant
222. USPTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 18, 125
(2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf.
223. Id. at 12.
224. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1756 (2011).
225. Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
226. See USPTO, supra note 218, § 1.56.
227. An exception is the Peer to Patent program, which was a peer-review pilot program that
started on October 25, 2010 and was to continue until September 30, 2011. Peer Review Pilot
FY2011, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init events/peerpriorartpilotindex.jsp (last vis-
ited July 20, 2011). The America Invents Act, passed in September 2011, envisions a mechanism
for third-party submission of prior art during the prosecution process. Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
228. Cf USPTO, supra note 222, at 18 ("One significant change was the count system which
gave examiners more time to examine each application as a clear sign that quality is [the
USPTO's] first priority.").
229. See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.
L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 18-19 (2007).
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is free to file an RCE and restart the prosecution process.230 Thus, the
only way an examiner can get rid of a recalcitrant applicant is to allow
the application.231
The result is a process that has led many to question the legitimacy
of the Federal Circuit's clear and convincing evidence standard. Such
commentators argue that this evidentiary burden inefficiently fetters a
defendant's ability to invalidate an asserted patent at trial.232
This is perhaps the paradigmatic example of systemic bias. Under
the preponderance of the evidence standard, a court is "correct" to
find a patent valid if the weight of the evidence establishes that it is
marginally more likely than not to be invalid. The Federal Circuit's
interpretation of the presumption of validity thus shifts the relevant
metric from whether the patent is more probably valid than not to
whether the evidence makes such invalidity clear. Assuming that
judges and juries endeavor to reach the result prescribed by law,
under the clear and convincing evidence standard they will accurately,
yet perversely, render decisions that systemically overcompensates
patentees. Thus, if one credits the view that the Patent Act establishes
a neutral framework for applying innovation-maximizing principles of
patentability to a wide variety of inventions, then one should oppose
an evidentiary burden that consistently skews the outcome of the judi-
ciary's analysis.
Yet, as is invariably the case with respect to any issue of contempo-
rary importance to the patent system, controversy exists. The legiti-
macy of the clear-and-convincing standard is bitterly contested. Given
the broad spectrum of characteristics displayed by the many different
industries under the patent regime's charge, it should be unsurprising
that a proposed measure that would dilute patents' prophylactic effect
would be welcomed by some and reviled by others. Predictably, the
pharmaceutical industry fiercely opposes any weakening in the pre-
sumption. Conversely, companies practicing in the IT sector welcome
230. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 63, 67-68 (2004).
231. See id. at 68.
232. See, e.g., B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A
Critique, 36 AIPLA O.J. 369, 412 (2008); Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Va-
lidity, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 323, 338 (2008); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 221. Cf Stuart Minor
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 319 (2007) (arguing for the application of administrative
law principles and greater deference to fact finding in patent litigation).
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the prospect of being able to invalidate a patent by no greater a show-
ing than a balance of probabilities. 233
Who is right? The answer might depend on whose interests one
wishes to promote. Given pharmaceutical and certain biotechnologi-
cal companies' vulnerability to third-party appropriation-and hence
greater reliance on patent protection-it is certainly conceivable that
bolstering IP protection through the imposition of a demanding evi-
dentiary burden to invalidate patents would lead to greater levels of
innovation.
Yet, such a defense of the clear-and-convincing rule encounters two
major problems. The first is founded on legitimacy. If one applauds a
court's upholding an improvidently granted patent, one's normative
baseline is necessarily distinct from the constituent elements of pat-
entability laid down by congressional mandate. This need not be fatal,
for those charged with running the patent system should not be blind
to the consequences of their actions with respect to innovation incen-
tives. Nevertheless, the issue of legitimacy fatally combines with the
larger problem of trans-industry effect to undermine the clear-and-
convincing rule. Even if one believes that courts should uphold mar-
ginally invalid patents in capital-intensive research industries such as
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, this does not translate into an
equivalent policy prescription for other industries.234 As noted above,
the divergent innovation characteristics of different markets suggest
that an effective policy in one setting may have negative repercussions
in others. As society lacks the means to weigh the depressive effects
of a rule on innovation in one industry against that rule's desirable
impact in others, the author argues that the issue of legitimacy should
control.235 Thus, if policymakers can agree that a rule that leads to
systemic departures from compliance with the statutorily required
tenets of patentability, they should proscribe that particular rule.
The Article therefore concludes that Congress should jettison the
clear and convincing evidence rule, which serves to induce systemic
departures from judicial determinations of optimal compensation.
233. See, e.g., Brief of Bus. Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290); Brief of Amici Curiae
Elec. Frontier Found. et al. in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2238.
234. Indeed, given the plethora of business-method, computer-software, and other IT patents,
many of which are of dubious validity, such an artificial impediment to invalidation is most
unlikely to be efficient. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). This conclusion is bolstered by the negative effects of the patent
system in these fields, as explored in Part I.
235. As noted below, reverse-exclusionary payments are distinct because their impact is lim-
ited to a single industrial setting: biopharmaceuticals.
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Unfortunately, on June 9, 2011, the Supreme Court declined the op-
portunity to revisit this aspect of the law, 236 and so a solution-if it
will arise at all-lies in the hands of Congress. In September 2011, in
enacting patent-reform legislation, Congress unfortunately declined to
specify a balance-of-probabilities standard.237
b. The Entire-Market-Value Rule and the Risk of Patentee
Overcompensation
It is well settled that a patentee, in the event of established infringe-
ment, is entitled to damages, which cannot be less than a reasonable
royalty.238 This principle is not controversial. The same cannot be
said for the manner in which some courts have gone about calculating
that royalty. 239 As Part I explained, products in different industries
differ dramatically in the number of patents to which they are typi-
cally subject. Marketed drugs are usually subject to a single patent,
while hundreds, if not thousands, of patents may cover a single semi-
conductor or other components of computer hardware. Common
sense suggests that the consequences of infringing a single patent
should differ depending on whether the infringed technology sub-
sumed the entire infringing product or merely covered a modest sub-
set of it. Two tenets of patent jurisprudence obscure this distinction-
one blatantly, the other more subtly.
In the first place, the courts have-until very recently-adopted a
twenty-five percent rule of thumb in calculating a reasonable royalty,
pursuant to which a fact finder would initially presume that a hypo-
thetical licensee would pay the patentee a royalty equal to one quarter
of the profit that the hypothetical licensee would expect to receive on
sales of the product incorporating the patented technology.240 In
early 2011, the Federal Circuit put this arbitrary presumption to
rest.241
A second feature of patent-damage jurisprudence bears more subtle
potential for harm. In calculating damages, the courts have fashioned
the so-called "entire-market-value rule," by which they appeal to the
actual profits realized through commercial sales of the infringing
product.242 The courts treat those sales as a metric by which to
236. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2252.
237. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
238. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
239. See FED TRADE COMM'N, supra note 103, at 179-212.
240. See Uniloc USA. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
241. Id. at 1315.
242. Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Electronics Co., 616 F.3d 1357, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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determine a reasonable royalty. Some observers have criticized this
rule, contending that it has led juries to consistently overreward pat-
entees, especially in the electronics and computer industries. 243
The entire-market-value rule is subject to an important qualifica-
tion, however, which one might expect to put concerns of bias to rest.
By its explicit terms, the rule only applies when the infringed patented
technology is the basis for consumer demand for the accused
product.244
Without this condition, the rule's potential to skew damages north-
ward would be self-evident. In patent suits not involving bio-
pharmaceutical products, mechanical devices, chemical processes, or
certain biotechnology-driven medical diagnostic techniques, the ac-
cused product is likely to incorporate a large number of technological
components, many of which will be either unpatented or subject to the
proprietary control of third parties. As a question of economics, it is
clear that a patentee's proper measure of damages in the form of a
reasonable royalty is that which reflects the patent's technological
contribution to the commercialized product. A "reasonable royalty"
is the price that the company wishing to market the relevant product
would have paid to obtain a license for the patented product or pro-
cess ex ante. Importantly, this price reflects the royalty-depressing ef-
fect of competition between owners of substitute, patented
technologies.2 45 The appropriate "hypothetical royalty" has no bear-
ing on the other components in the final product that are outside the
scope of the relevant patent. Nor does it track the royalty that the
allegedly infringing company would rationally pay ex post-that is,
post-commercialization. Ex post, a patentee can extract a far greater
amount of value than it could have ex ante, due to the related effects
of lock-in and the elimination of substitute technologies that lock-in
entails. 246 Importantly, these features, which are irrelevant to the
243. See generally Love, supra note 7.
244. Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
245. Until 2006, the Supreme Court mistakenly presumed that a patent bestows significant
market power on its owner. It wisely rejected this presumption in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
246. To elaborate, those operating in industries subject to anticommons effects must contend
with strategic hold out by patentees who bring suit only after the industry or particular defend-
ants lock into a technology, of which the patented claims constitute a small part. Such lock-in
creates a gulf between the royalty that the prospective licensor and licensee would agree to ex
ante, on the one hand, and that which they would agree to ex post, on the other. The asymmetry
arises from the elimination of competition between functional substitutes that existed ex ante.
One wishing to commercialize a technologically advanced product can often look to a variety of
separately owned technologies that perform comparable functions. Owners of the relevant pat-
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determination of an optimal damage award, are apt to be especially
pronounced in patent cases involving IT, semiconductors, and other
computer hardware.
It is now possible to appreciate the danger of the entire-market-
value rule, which "permits recovery of damages based on the value of
a patentee's entire apparatus containing several features." 247 This un-
qualified statement of the rule would obviously be improper, regard-
less of bias. If a jury rendered factual determinations that were
perfectly accurate in light of the instructions they have received, then
juries so instructed in the law would grant patentees a windfall. Pat-
ent holders would receive damages that reflect a value that goes far
beyond the scope of their claimed inventions. They would wrongly
benefit from technologies that either lie in the public domain or were
owned by third parties. Perverse results would include patentee over-
compensation-and hence inefficiently high incentives to invent-and
artificial impediments to commercialization that increase the cost, and
thus reducing the level, of marketing products that require use of
many technological components.
Critically, though, a court can employ the entire-market-value rule
only if the allegedly infringed patent claims a technology that is the
basis for customer demand. 248 Does this solve the problem? Not nec-
essarily. For one thing, in many cases it is not easy to identify which of
many technological features in a product forms the basis for consumer
demand. If 2,000 patents cover a particular microprocessor and the
single asserted patent is indispensable to the operation of the chip,
though neither prominent in the whole product nor the only necessary
component of the same, does it drive consumer demand? As the con-
cept of "the basis for consumer demand" displays an amorphous qual-
ity, courts are likely to apply the entire-market-value rule in
circumstances they should not.
Beyond the problem of applying the Federal Circuit's abstract dam-
ages principle, this Article argues that the entire-market-value rule
ent rights have an incentive to compete with one another to offer superior terms to the prospec-
tive licensee in order to win inclusion in the product. The correct reasonable royalty is that
which reflects the presence of such competition, thus reflecting what the parties would have
agreed to ex ante. Yet, the vast majority of patent-infringement proceedings arise in cases of
inadvertent incursion upon another's patented claims. As the relevant defendant has already
marketed a final product, whatever technological substitutes that may have existed ex ante are
now, in many respects, academic. The absence of ex post competition artificially enhances the
perceived market value of the infringed technology, thus potentially leading a court to award
excessive damages.
247. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
248. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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invites systemic overcompensation and that the law should therefore
jettison it. The problem lies in the reference point against which
courts invite jurors to make damage determinations with respect to an
infringed technology that, although residing at the heart of the ac-
cused device, constitutes merely one of several components that col-
lectively constitute a functional unit. Instead of presenting fact finders
with a neutral framework within which to determine the price that the
parties would have agreed to ex ante for a license, the entire-market-
value rule places the overall sales of the product, which incorporates
multiple technologies beyond the patented one, at the heart of the
inquiry. As a result, jurors' reference point invites skewed damage
determinations.
Specifically, this framing effect is apt to induce jurors to render
damage figures that incorporate technological values greater than
those represented by the asserted patent alone. This bias is likely to
be systemic, meaning that jurors' damage calculations over time will
consistently depart from the optimal level. In other words, the aver-
age jury award in patent cases involving products that entail the use of
numerous, discrete technologies will likely be inefficiently high on ac-
count of the entire-market-value rule.
Viewing this rule through the lens of systemic bias suggests that the
courts should jettison it. Interestingly, practice would seem to reflect
theory in this case, as there are numerous reports of entire-market-
value rule inducing excessive rewards. 2 4 9 As this rule presents fact
finders with an inappropriate reference point, the courts should abol-
ish it.250
c. "Pay-for-Delay" Agreements in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Few phenomena in the patent realm have invited greater umbrage
than pioneer-drug manufacturers' practice of paying generic-drug pro-
ducers to concede the validity of their patents and delay entering the
249. See generally Love, supra note 7.
250. Of course, this is not an unchallenged view. Numerous industry participants characterize
the rule as an important guide to calculating damages and contest the idea that patentees are the
recipients of excessive pecuniary rewards in the event of proven infringement. Indeed, certain
influential commentators have bemoaned the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay to deprive
patentees of automatic injunctive relief in the event of established infringement. See, e.g., Rich-
ard Epstein, Patent Injunctions and Repeat Offenders, FT.com, (Nov. 6, 2010, 12:12 AM), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/62e01bb0-e93a-lldf-aecO-00144feab49a.html#axzzltTP686pL. Such individ-
uals, who are sometimes associated with the property-rights movement, lament the Court's juris-
prudence, which they see as leading inexorably to patentee undercompensation. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, REGULATION,
Winter 2008, at 58, 62.
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market. 251 To understand the context in which such agreements arise,
one must appreciate that a generic-drug company can bypass much of
the FDA regulatory-approval process by demonstrating that its drug is
bioequivalent with, and has the same active ingredient, route of ad-
ministration, dosage form, strength, and proposed labeling as, a drug
listed in the Orange Book.252 Such a showing allows a company to
obtain regulatory approval through the far-shorter ANDA process. 253
The only major impediment to a company's marketing a generic drug
is the pioneer manufacturer's patent. FDA regulations prohibit the
agency from commencing the approval process until the applicant
makes an appropriate certification-typically a paragraph IV certifi-
cation that the incumbent's patent is invalid or not infringed,254 which
constitutes an act of patent infringement.255 The Hatch-Waxman Act
creates an incentive for the patent-holdiig drug manufacturer to bring
suit for infringement by prescribing a thirty-month stay that prevents
the FDA's approving the generic for that length of time if the paten-
tee brings suit within forty-five days. 256 Pioneer-drug producers thus
find themselves embroiled in litigation, having to assert, and hence
defend the validity of, patents that they acquired in order to protect
their R&D investment. 257
It should be unsurprising that settlements abound in this context,
especially given the fact that generic-drug manufacturers have an in-
centive to challenge the most valuable patents-to which pioneer-
drug companies will be risk averse-rather than the weakest patents.
However, these agreements have entailed a controversial feature,
which is that, in return for a large amount of money, ANDA filers
agree not to enter the relevant patentees' markets for a time-poten-
tially until the expiration of the patents. Such "pay-for-delay"
251. Richard M. Hagstrom & Lindsey A. Davis, The FTC's War on 'Pay-for-Delay' Agree-
ments, COMPETITION LAw360 (2011), available at http://www.law360.com/competition.
252. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v) (2006).
253. Indeed, the fixed cost for a generic-drug producer to enter a market is typically around
$2 million. See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MAN-
AGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439, 443 (2007). Two million dollars obviously pales in significance
compared to the costs of researching, developing, and marketing a pioneer drug, which commen-
tators have estimated to be between $110 million (which is likely a significant underestimate)
and $2 billion (which is probably an overestimate). See supra notes 60-80 and accompanying
text.
254. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
255. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
256. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
257. Note, however, that brand-name drug manufacturers are the ones that bring suit under
the Hatch-Waxman scheme, which encourages them to do so by granting a thirty-month stay on
FDA approval of a generic equivalent of the pioneer drug. Id.
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agreements are now commonplace within the industry and are im-
mensely controversial.
Almost every court has found these arrangements to be lawful, al-
though the courts differ on their scope of permissibility. 258 Neverthe-
less, reverse-exclusionary payments have invoked the ire of America's
antitrust-enforcement agencies. 259 Many academics condemn the ar-
rangements, in particular, for foreclosing the generic competition that
Congress intended to foster with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 2 6 0 In March 2011, the Supreme Court surprisingly denied certio-
rari in a petition from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, which had articulated a rule of conclusive legality when the
patent litigation was not baseless and the settlement did not impose
restrictions going beyond the scope of the relevant patent.261 In light
of the Supreme Court's decision not to hear the case, it is now clear
that reverse-exclusionary arrangements are generally lawful when the
underlying patents are not obviously invalid.
The author has previously argued that principles of decision theory
suggest erring on the side of permissibility with respect to pay-for-
delay agreements and that the courts' treatment of these phenomena
is generally correcf. 2 6 2 For the purpose of the present Article, how-
ever, the question is whether the concept of systemic bias can yield a
valuable insight into how the law should receive these arrangements.
For the concept to do so, those employing it would have to embrace
a common metric by which to judge the desirability of these arrange-
ments. Likely because it is unclear whether pay-for-delay settlements
enhance ex post returns for pioneer-drug inventors in a desirable way,
many commentators seek a distinct metric against which to measure
these arrangements' permissibility. They take as a given that the opti-
mal degree of patent protection is that which follows from an accurate
application of the provisions of the Patent Act. From this perspective,
258. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 105-06 (2d
Cir. 2010); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydro-
chloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992-94
(N.D. Ill. 2003). But cf La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
259. See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), rev'd, 402 F.3d
1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
260. See, e.g., Brief of 86 Intellectual Prop. Law, Antitrust Law, Econ., Bus. & Pub. Health
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Certiorari, La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG.
246 F.3d 1368 (2011) (No. 10-762) (filed by Professor Mark A. Lemley).
261. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d at 98, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
262. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 75, 109-15
(2010).
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society overcompensates a patentee if the latter successfully enforces
its exclusive rights in circumstances when a scrutinizing examination
would have denied it those rights. It is clear, then, why those who
hold this view condemn reverse-exclusionary agreements. Such ar-
rangements allow at least some patents to survive and generate profit
for their owners in circumstances that courts would otherwise invali-
date them or find them not infringed at trial. These critics object to
arrangements that allow patentees to appropriate greater value from
their IP rights than they would have garnered from an unfettered ap-
plication of the rights granted them by Congress. Few ask whether the
greater pecuniary rewards realized by patentees on account of these
agreements in fact generate desirable incentives to devote further re-
sources to the innovative process ex ante.
Within this framework, which deems an agreement objectionable if
it yields an outcome different than what would have transpired had
the parties proceeded to judgment, allowing pay-for-delay agreements
clearly biases the outcome upward from the "optimal" level.263
Within the confines of that normative baseline, analyzing for bias
reveals that the critics are indeed correct and that the law should not
permit settlements that involve patentees' paying generic-drug pro-
ducers not to enter the market. The only qualification to this con-
clusion lies in the possibility that allowing generics and brand-name
drug manufacturers to settle could lead to more "bad-patent" invali-
dation because such a facilitative rule increases the rate of ANDA
filings. Some scholarship supports this possibility, 264 though the better
reasoned literature is to the contrary.265
Yet, are critics right to condemn a reverse-exclusionary arrange-
ment that allows a patent to survive when it would have floundered in
court? The author believes that the answer is not necessarily, and this
point reveals that the systemic-bias inquiry provides useful guidance
only when observers can agree on a common normative metric.
One might suppose that society gains by denying patent protection
to pharmaceutical products and processes that do not meet the re-
quirements of nonobviousness, novelty, utility, and disclosure. Yet,
this view is not accurate in an absolute sense. A well-known example
involves drugs that, though socially valuable, are unpatentable and
263. To emphasize, "optimal" here refers not to the actual correct level for maximizing long-
run social welfare, but to the return that would follow from an accurate application of the prin-
ciples of the Patent Act to the relevant compound or formulation drug patent.
264. See, e.g., Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fal-
lacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033 (2004).
265. See Hemphill, supra note 194.
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hence underproduced absent regulatory exclusivity or some other so-
lution.266 There are many drug patents of probable, though uncertain,
validity ex ante. Where drug patents are likely (albeit not definitely)
valid and protect a vast amount of capital investment, it is far from
clear as a normative matter that society gains by denying IP pro-
tection. For this reason, ANDA-litigation settlements with reverse
payments need not always be problematic.
There are a number of reasons to be concerned that the pharmaceu-
tical regulatory structure affects pioneer-drug manufacturers' incen-
tives to invent and commercialize the most important drugs in a
potentially problematic way. First, the "policing function" performed
by ANDA filers is heavily biased toward blockbuster drugs because
generic-drug producers tend not to challenge the weakest drug pat-
ents, but rather the most valuable ones. 26 7 Although consumers do
stand to gain the most-in static-efficiency terms268-from invalida-
tion of the most lucrative drug patents, consumer benefit is less clear
from a dynamic-efficiency perspective. 269 This is because pioneer-
drug manufacturers are desperately reliant on a small number of
highly profitable blockbuster drugs to cross-subsidize their R&D costs
with the far greater number of failed drugs.270 There is no doubting
the social value of these products, and so it is not clear that the law
should deny patent protection on technical grounds.
Second, and as a result of the above, brand-name drug producers
are highly risk averse in defending their most valuable drug patents. 271
This suggests that denying such companies the ability to settle patent-
infringement suits will impose significant disutility on them, and thus
harm incentives to invent and market new drugs.
Third, ANDA filers. enjoy a far-superior litigation position than
brand-name drug manufacturers because they have made no sales,
and they are merely subject to nominal damages in the event that the
266. See generally Roin, supra note 60.
267. Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to
Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-Pharmaceutical Compa-
nies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 658-59 (2008).
268. Static efficiency refers to the conditions of allocative and productive efficiency associated
with perfect competition (when price equals marginal cost).
269. Dynamic efficiency refers to the efficiency gains created by technological innovation.
270. Indeed, a majority of FDA-approved drugs do not cover their own costs, and it is well
known that the odds of an initially researched chemical compound's producing a viable drug are
between 1 in 5,000 and 1 in 10,000. See, e.g., PHRMA, DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE R&D PROCEss 11 (2007).
271. See, e.g., Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Phar-
maceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 381 (2010).
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patentee prevails in court.272 By contrast, a finding of nonvalidity is
devastating to the brand-name-drug producer, which, by virtue of
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion, loses its patent protection for-
ever. Lastly, patent litigation is notoriously expensive-the typical
cost of litigating a patent-infringement suit is between $3 million and
$6 million. 273
Combined, these factors reveal that the process of ANDA filing and
subsequent litigation is heavily skewed against incumbent drug pro-
ducers. In this respect, there is a systemic institutional bias against
pioneer-drug manufacturers that complicates the question of bias in
analyzing pay-for-delay arrangements. What is clear is that brand-
name drug producers are better off in a world in which the law allows
them to pay ANDA filers to stay out of their markets for a time than
if the courts only permitted them to enter into settlements without
payments. Whether this feature of paying for delay is desirable de-
pends in part on whether one accepts the prescription that an antitrust
rule is efficient if it reorients patentee compensation closer to the opti-
mal level. This inquiry is distinct from whether reverse-exclusionary
agreements allow some patents to survive that do not meet one or
more of the technical requirements of patentability that Congress has
established.
A number of academics criticize pay-for-delay agreements on the
ground that without payments, the parties would enter into settle-
ments allowing ANDA filers to enter the relevant markets sooner.
The clear premise is that something is "pro-competitive" and hence
desirable if it results in earlier competition and concomitant consumer
savings. Illustratively, the FTC regularly propounds the result of its
2010 study that pay-for-delay agreements cost U.S. consumers $3.5
billion per year. 274 By this logic, however, one would have to support
the wholesale abolition of the patent system.
Presumably, most critics of reverse-exclusionary agreements do not
advocate such a course, but instead harbor concerns for both short-
term (static) and long-term (dynamic) consumer welfare. They are
right to do so. Yet, one can legitimately criticize their condemnation
of pay-for-delay agreements on account of their neglecting dynamic
272. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("An ANDA filing by its very nature is a highly artificial act of infringement . . . ." (quot-
ing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
273. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29
(2009).
274. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CON-
SUMERS BILLIONs 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
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effects. It is entirely possible-though no one points it out-that
these assailed agreements could, with respect to likely-valid patents,
align brand-name drug manufacturers' incentive to invent more
closely with the social optimum. One disclaiming such a possibility
need only observe the pharmaceutical industry's fragile dependence
on patents, as evidenced by the industry's sharply reduced expected
revenue in 2011 on account of the "patent cliff" that will see a small
number of valuable patents expire, 275 as well as the extraordinary cap-
ital investment required to innovate. When, as in the bio-
pharmaceutical sector, average costs far surpass marginal costs, open
competition-facilitated by patent invalidation or abolition-will
render first movers insolvent. Dynamic incentives matter enormously
in this setting, and yet critics pass insufficient attention to them.
Of course, the preceding discussion does not warrant per se lawful
treatment of pay-for-delay agreements. Statistics suggest that pay-for-
delay agreements can protect patents of dubious validity, and for
these drug products and processes, we can afford to be more skeptical
of the claimed benefits of exclusivity. Any sensible analysis of such
arrangements must be grounded on the facts specific to each one and
must involve an examination of the likelihood of patent validity and
infringement. In the author's view, courts should be cognizant of the
particular kind of patents before them. For instance, the FTC found
that generics won seventy-three percent of patent-infringement cases
between 1992 and 2000,276 but these figures may be misleading in light
of selection bias (brand-name drug manufacturers are unlikely to liti-
gate their most valuable or strongest drug patents to trial) and be-
cause they conflate different kinds of drug patents. In this respect, the
value and likely validity of drug-substance, drug-product, and method-
of-use patents may be significantly different. Drug-substance patents
covering new chemical entities that are useful for treating significant
conditions, for instance, are likely to be valid, lucrative, and most im-
portantly, of great social value. More prosaic patent-protected inno-
vations-such as reformulating a drug from capsule to tablet form-
may be of less (though not insignificant) value and also less likely to
meet the statutory conditions of patentability enshrined in the Patent
Act. Courts should be cognizant of the kind of patents being chal-
lenged, as well as the investment that underlies it.
275. See Buying Time, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2009, at 70, 70; Shruti U. Bhat, The 2011 Drug
Patent 'Cliff: The Evolution of IP Valuation, PATENTS & INTELL. PROP. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://pharmaceutical-patents.blogspot.com/2011/01/2011-drug-patent-cliff-evolution-of-ip.html.
276. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 76, at 16.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The patent field is beset with policy challenges. Cries that the pat-
ent system is broken abound and emanate from an eclectic range of
industries. 277 Once a radical view, contemporary advocates of patent
abolition now include respected economists.278 Although few outside
the patent bar and pharmaceutical industry 279 maintain that the cur-
rent regime operates desirably, still fewer agree on what exactly is
wrong with the status quo and which features of the patent system are
fitting candidates for revision.280 Powerful vested interests with diver-
gent views take entrenched positions, such that consensus for an over-
haul of patent law is likely to remain elusive. To confirm this view,
one need merely observe the continuous string of failed congressional
attempts at patent reform each of the last several years. When every-
one has a different view, but strong evidence exists that the current
patent system is in at least some respects imperfect, what can policy-
makers do?
At a high level, there is at least one clear answer. As Dan L. Burk
and Mark A. Lemley convincingly argue, the heterogeneous nature of
industrial innovation suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to pat-
ent law is mistaken.281 As numerous constituent elements of patent
jurisprudence lend themselves to flexible, and hence asymmetric, ap-
plication, courts should construe patent doctrine in light of the distinct
industrial characteristics presented by each case. In this manner,
judges could more closely align the incentives generated by the patent
system with the unique innovation features displayed by different
industries. 282
The author supports such an approach to patent policy, though he
believes that such context-specific analysis is desirable only in a
second-best sense. Tailoring ostensibly identical principles of law to a
variety of settings arguably comes at some expense to the patent sys-
tem's legitimacy. Furthermore, obvious limits exist as to how far
courts can go in tailoring what purport to be rules of horizontal appli-
cation to the distinct characteristics of different settings. Neverthe-
less, insofar as a larger legislative solution aimed at incorporating
277. THE PATENT CRIsIS, supra note 17, at 3-4.
278. See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 2, at 11.
279. Generic-drug producers, of course, do not share pioneer-drug manufacturers' zeal for
strong patent protection.
280. THE PATENT CRISIs, supra note 17, at 3-4.
281. Id. at 5.
282. For a contrary view on the desirability of tailoring patent law to the traits of different
industries, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual
Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 897 (1988).
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industry-specific considerations into law remains unavailable, one can
welcome the Burk-Lemley approach.
This Article offers a distinct, though complementary, method of
analysis. Observing that hostility to particular features of the patent
regime emanates not from the abstract quality of those features, but
from the courts' and examiners' capacity to misapply them, the author
suggests that policymakers reorient their analysis toward the nature of
each challenged tenet of patent law. The Article observes that even
pervasive ex post error on the part of important actors within the pat-
ent system need not result in skewed, and hence inefficient, incentives.
Over time and a sufficiently large number of cases, the expected re-
ward from obtaining a patent should approximate the optimal level if
judges, juries, and examiners strive to reach the correct answer in
every case, given the information at hand.
There are identifiable circumstances in which this assumption is un-
likely to hold. Desirable outcomes in which long-run deviations from
the (optimal) mean cancel each other out are unlikely to materialize
when actors are subject to powerful systemic biases. The author ar-
gues that one way to approach divisive policy issues is to scrutinize
them for their tendency to significantly skew outcomes in a particular
direction.
Viewed in this light, one can question the desirability of certain ten-
ets of the law that would be innocuous in an error-free patent system.
A clear example is the entire-market-value rule in circumstances when
the asserted patent claims but one aspect of the technology underlying
a commercialized product. By framing a jury's determination of dam-
ages in light of the profitability of the infringing device, the rule in-
vites jurors to reach conclusions that depart upward from the accurate
level. The correct reference point is the relevant patent's technologi-
cal contribution to the marketed product, which informs the price to
which the parties would have rationally agreed on a license ex ante.
By substituting this reference point for one founded on the overall
profitability of the commercialized good, which incorporates multiple
technological components, the law consistently induces fact finders to
reach artificially inflated damage awards. Instead, the law should
strive to orient jurors' reasoning with a neutral metric that invites
long-run conclusions that approximate the correct result.
The clear and convincing evidence standard for invalidating a pat-
ent also invites systemic bias. It does so by acting as an artificial im-
pediment to the courts' important screening function, which involves
skimming improvidently granted patents from the pool of enforceable
IP rights. Were the relevant evidentiary threshold equal to the default
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standard in civil cases-preponderance of the evidence-courts in ap-
proaching the question of nonobviousness, novelty, and enablement
would strive to make correct determinations in a neutral environment.
Congress upset that neutrality in mandating a presumption of validity,
which the courts have compounded with their clear-and-convincing in-
terpretation of the same. This feature of the law ensures that, other
things being equal, courts overcompensate patentees in the long run
by bestowing a subset of them with a windfall. As many prospective
patentees will not know ex ante whether their claimed invention will
run afoul of a provision of the Patent Act, the clear-and-convincing
standard serves to enhance the expected return of obtaining a patent.
This enhancement applies across all industries, and one cannot sup-
port it by reference to the particular characteristics of a given indus-
try. Given that there is no justification for such an across-the-board
bolstering of patents, which otherwise would be subject to unbiased
judicial scrutiny, Congress should reject it in light of the Supreme
Court's failure to do the same. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that the clear and convincing evidence standard increases the ex-
pected cost of litigating a patent's validity, thus further exacerbating
the public-goods problem of challenging bad patents.283
Finally, there exists the more vexing issue of pay-for-delay arrange-
ments, which-uniquely amongst the tenets of patent law addressed in
this Article-arise in a single industry. Given the context-specific en-
vironment in which they occur, reverse-exclusionary payments raise
an important question whether they affect patentee compensation in a
way that desirably promotes dynamic efficiency. Lacking effective
means to undertake this analysis, however, most commentators rely
on the technical requirements of patentability. From this perspective,
the optimal reward for companies operating in the biopharmaceutical
sector is that which flows from patents that meet the requirements of
the Patent Act. The courts' facilitation of pay-for-delay agreements
unquestionably shields some patents that would fail to survive judicial
scrutiny. So viewed, there is little doubt that they introduce signifi-
cant systemic bias into the patent system and facilitate long-term pat-
entee overcompensation. As explained above, though, the regulatory
infrastructure in the pharmaceutical field introduces a bias in the op-
posite direction by curtailing the rewards of those companies that in-
vent and commercialize the most valuable drugs. As a result, the
283. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004).
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optimal rule governing pay-for-delay settlements is a complicated
matter. Though, in the author's view, the courts largely have it right
in employing a rule-of-reason inquiry.
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